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## ABSTRACT

Four papers concerned with clarifying some pragmatic phenomena by comparing them in English and Finnish are presented. "Directives in English and Finnish" compares the conventionalized forms of expressing the directive speech act primarily from the viewpoint of their sentential form and content and their appropriateness in context. "English Parenthetical Clauses of the Type 'I Believe/You Know' and Their Finnish Equivalents" examines the difference between function and content in these clauses in the two languages. "'This', 'That', 'It' vs. 'Tama', 'Tuo', 'Se'" looks at the various uses of the demonstrative pronouns and their relationship in theory. "'Please' and 'Ole Hyva'" analyzes the issue of only partial functional correspondence of words and phrases that are often given as equivalents in language instruction. A bibliography is included. (MSE)

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GROSS-LANGUAGE STUDIES  
IN PRAGMATICS

by Raija Markkanen

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## CROSS-LANGUAGE STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS: INTRODUCTION

Most present-day linguists would agree with Leech's (1983) claim that we can only really understand the nature of language if we understand pragmatics, which Leech equates with the study of language used in communication. For a definition of pragmatics this is, however, too vague. Defining the field of pragmatics is by no means an easy task, as is very well illustrated by Levinson (1983). Particularly difficult seems to be the drawing of distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between pragmatics and sociolinguistics, if indeed such distinctions are necessary. Leech sees the difference between pragmatics and semantics in their different definitions of meaning: meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to the user of language, whereas in semantics it is defined 'purely as a property of expressions in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers, or hearers'. On the same lines with Leech's view, although more detailed, is Gazdar's (1979) definition of pragmatics, which is also the one that Levinson (1983:12) favours: 'Pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentence uttered. Put crudely: pragmatics = meaning - truth-conditions.'

Although the above definition indicates where to draw the borderline between semantics and pragmatics, it leaves open the question of the borderline at the other end, i.e. between pragmatics and sociolinguistics. In what way or to what extent should pragmatic studies take into consideration particular situations, speakers, and hearers? One of the possible definitions for pragmatics that Levinson (1983:24) considers and which he regards as the most popular one is that 'pragmatics is the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be appropriate'. Such a definition causes pragmatics to overlap with sociolinguistics because appropriateness is one of the aspects of communicative competence as defined by Hymes (1971) and communicative competence can be considered the object of sociolinguistic studies. Moreover, it could be said that pragmatics, if defined in this way, comes close to psycholinguistics. Yet, there are linguistic phenomena which are explained only halfway if we do not consider also their appropriateness for contexts.

Leech (1983) seems to be able to overcome this definitional problem, by distinguishing general pragmatics from pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. General pragmatics is, according to him, concerned with 'the general conditions of the communicative use of language' and thus a

fairly abstract type of study. Both pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics deal with concrete, language-specific phenomena: pragmalinguistics considers what resources for conveying particular illocutions are found in a given language and socio-pragmatics studies how pragmatic principles operate in different cultures, in different social situations, among different social classes, etc. This means, then, that we have as it were a pragmatic scale, one end of which touches grammar (in the sense of 'study of the structure of language') and the other approaches sociology. This also means that there are phenomena that can be called pragmatic even though they remain close to the grammatical end of the scale and others that are pragmatic in spite of their sociolinguistic bias. It is also justified to carry out studies which try to cover both the grammatical and the sociolinguistic end of the scale, which adds to the understanding of pragmatic phenomena.

The studies included in this volume start from the grammatical end of the pragmatic scale and move towards the sociolinguistic one; most of them, however, stay closer to the grammatical end. They can all be called pragmatic on the strength of the definitions discussed above. Deictic expressions, to which the demonstrative pronouns discussed in the first paper belong, are a pragmatic phenomenon par excellence for they are concerned with 'the encoding of many different aspects of the circumstances surrounding the utterance, within the utterance itself' (Levinson 1983:55). Please and ole hyvå, which are compared in the second paper, are typically items whose analysis is totally impossible using traditional linguistic means but which have to be analysed with reference to their function in contexts. The parentheticals, discussed in the fourth paper, are similar to please and ole hyvå in that they are really analysable only through their functions, but their analysis can remain fairly close to the grammatical end. However, in the treatment of the expressions of the directive speech act, one has to go further towards the sociolinguistic end; i.e. their function cannot be explained without at least some consideration of the effect of certain social variables, as will be seen in the third paper. All the phenomena discussed in the following papers are, however, anchored in context and resist pure truth-conditional analysis.

The pragmatic nature of the phenomena mentioned above becomes even clearer when we try to compare them across languages, because the same pragmatic functions can be grammaticalized in very different ways in different languages, which means that a semantico-syntactic

analysis does not offer sufficient material for a comparison. Different features of the situation might be important in deciding what can be expressed, should be expressed, or how something ought to be expressed in different languages. It is on the basis of language-specific studies and the material yielded by them that we can build up some idea of just which aspects of the context of utterances are likely in general to exert functional pressures on language' (Levinson 1983:43). General pragmatics in other words needs language-specific material and also cross-language comparisons to formulate its theories. Levinson (1983:43) suggests that such studies would offer us a 'discovery procedure' for the relevant functions of language: we could first consider those features of context which are grammaticalized in some languages and then proceed to see how other languages, without such grammaticalizations, express the same functions, if at all.

Cross-language comparisons of pragmatic phenomena are important also in other ways. It is now a generally acknowledged fact that for the language learner - whether a child acquiring his/her first language or a second language learner - it is not enough to acquire/learn grammatical competence, i.e. the ability to produce and recognize grammatically correct sentences, but that their use in appropriate situations has to be learnt/acquired as well. As a matter of fact, pragmatic mistakes may be more serious than errors made in grammar or pronunciation, for, as Thomas (1983) points out, native speakers make allowances for grammatical and pronunciation errors whereas pragmatic errors make the speakers sound boorish or impolite, particularly if they are grammatically fluent. Pragmatic errors can lead to serious misjudgements of the speakers' personalities and/or their intentions.

Following the above mentioned division into pragmalinguistics and socio-pragmatics, failures in this area can be either pragmalinguistic or socio-pragmatic. The difference is that 'pragmalinguistic failure is caused by differences in the linguistic encoding of pragmatic forces, socio-pragmatic failure stems from the cross-culturally different perceptions of what constitutes 'appropriate linguistic behaviour' (Thomas 1983:96). Both types of failure can, however, be due to mother tongue interference or, perhaps we should say, interference from the 'native' culture in the case of socio-pragmatic failure. When committing pragmalinguistic failures the foreign language learners can be under the erroneous assumption that the expression used for a particular function in their mother tongue is directly translatable into the foreign lan-



guage, which is not necessarily the case. Socio-pragmatic failure in its turn might occur in cases in which the expressions are grammatically and semantically equivalent in the two languages but differ in their appropriateness for social situations. From this it follows that pragmatic principles should somehow be included in foreign language teaching, or, as Thomas (1983:109) puts it: "... we do a grave disservice even to those who are studying in the country of the target language, if we expect students simply to 'absorb' pragmatic norms without explicit formalization. Nor can we afford to regard the teaching of pragmatic appropriateness as the icing on the gingerbread - something best left until complete grammatical competence has been attained." This means, then, that pragmatic matters should be included in foreign language teaching from early stages onwards, which in turn leads to the need of effective teaching materials in this area. Since, as was suggested above, a lot of pragmatic failure can be attributed to mother tongue interference, it follows that the planning of teaching these matters necessitates cross-language comparisons between the mother tongue and the target language in this area.

The following papers are all attempts to clarify some pragmatic phenomena by comparing them between English and Finnish. They are problems which the writer has been interested in over the past few years, without necessarily realizing at the outset that they all have a common pragmatic denominator and could thus be brought together under the heading of cross-language pragmatics. They are not intended to be thorough investigations of the pragmatic areas they deal with. Rather, they each pick up some phenomena of interest from a much wider area, the areas of speech acts, deixis, etc. The fact that they all remain fairly close to the grammatical end of the pragmatic scale makes the problems of methodology easier to solve. If one were to go all the way to the sociolinguistic end of the scale, the need would arise for lots of natural conversational data in both languages, which would set serious limits to the possibilities that an individual researcher has. It is true, as Fraser, Rintell and Walters (1980:81) point out when discussing the study of speech act realizations, that 'the likelihood is very, very small that any practicable number of observations will provide enough examples of the same speech act with the contextual variables sufficiently controlled to permit satisfactory speculation on their significance'. The focus of attention being on the linguistic means employed in expressing pragmatic functions, the data can be kept at the

level of a limited number of texts (even texts constructed by the analyst), i.e. the methodology can be that followed in recent linguistics. This approach naturally gives only a partial view of the phenomena, particularly since para- and extralinguistic means of expression are left out altogether. It can, however, be argued that the phenomena discussed in these papers are so many-sided and complex that it is enough, as a first step to their comparison, to analyse the semanticosyntactic means available for their realization.

The actual contrasting between the two languages is carried out in three different ways. In the case of the directive speech act the starting point is the directive function itself, and both languages are analysed as to the different means of realizing this function. The starting point of the comparison of please and ole hyvä are these items themselves, which then are analysed functionally to see whether they really can be considered to be pragmatically equivalent. The same procedure is followed in the case of the demonstratives. This can be done because these are linguistic items which give the impression of being equivalent in the two languages and are often presented as such in dictionaries and grammars. The discussion of parentheticals starts from English, attempts at an analysis of their functions and then proceeds to see what possibilities Finnish has for expressing the same functions.

It can be hoped that even a partial analysis of these pragmatic phenomena will give some ideas and material for both general pragmatics and the more practical task of teaching pragmatic principles, and that perhaps these analyses will inspire others to carry out further investigations in this contrastively most interesting area.

DIRECTIVES IN ENGLISH  
AND FINNISH

Speech acts are undoubtedly the area of pragmatics that has aroused the greatest interest, not only among linguists, but also among philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, and even literary critics (cf. Levinson 1983:226). The importance of speech acts for foreign language teaching is emphasized for example by Jakobovits and Gordon (1974) and Widdowson (1978), who in discussing language use and its significance for language learning says that it 'has to do with propositions and the acts they are used to perform'. It is thus not enough to acquire the ability to produce correct sentences in a foreign language, it is also necessary to attain the ability to use them in effective communication, which necessarily includes the knowledge of their speech act function.

There are people who claim that once you can produce correct sentences in a foreign language their correct use will follow by itself, there is no need for the explicit teaching of the speech act functions of sentences. This view is apparently based on the assumption that the semantico-syntactic structure of utterances also reveals their speech act function, which is not the case in what are called indirect speech acts. Thus it is easy to believe Schmidt and Richards (1980:145) when they point out that 'instances of communication breakdown and misunderstanding among non-fluent users suggest that they frequently operate at the surface structure level identifying propositional content where it is marked directly, by lexis and grammar but often missing indirectly marked speech act functions'.

However, claims have been made about the universal nature of the linguistic expressions employed in expressing various speech acts. Fraser (1978:19), for example, maintains that 'the strategies for performing illocutionary acts, for conveying effects such as the intention of politeness, conveying relative deference, and for mitigating the force of the utterance are essentially the same across languages'. The term strategy is used by Fraser to mean 'a particular choice of sentential form and meaning which the speaker employs in order to perform the intended act'. According to Fraser, cultures differ only in which strategies are considered appropriate in a given context. This would mean that in foreign language learning one would have to learn only new attitudes to the appropriateness of strategies, but would not have to learn new strategies. This would also mean that in contrasting speech acts across languages we would only need to compare the appropriateness of strategies, not the strategies themselves.

If 'strategy' is taken to mean, as Fraser does, 'a particular choice of sentential form and meaning', the universality of speech act strategies would suggest that the utterances used in realizing a particular speech act would be directly translatable from one language to another. Schmidt and Richards (1980:140), however, point out that although all languages have performative verbs and some of them may be used for example to issue directives, this does not mean that all directive forms used for example in English 'have literal translations which function in the same way in all languages'. Searle (1979:50) also argues that 'the standard forms of one language might not have the same speech act potential when translated into another language'. Thus, if we talk about the universality of speech act strategies, they have to be phrased in very general terms (cf. Schmidt and Richards 1980:140). Therefore, although we can assume that certain 'basic' speech act types must be universal - it would be difficult to imagine a language without the possibility of issuing requests, making assertions, or asking questions - their actual expressions are not necessarily semantically and syntactically equivalent. This is particularly the case with speech acts, such as directives, whose expressions tend to become conventionalized. There seems thus to be need for cross-language research in the actual ways of expressing speech acts, not only in the appropriateness of the expressions in given contexts.

The study reported in this paper is an attempt to compare the conventionalized forms of expressing the directive speech act in English and Finnish, mainly from the point of view of their sentential form and content. An attempt is also made to compare their appropriateness in contexts. The focus is placed on the sentential form and content with an awareness that such a view only partially clarifies the possibilities of expression since it neglects features such as intonation and paralinguistic means of expression.

### Directives as Speech Acts

An essential condition for any contrastive analysis is a definition of the tertium comparationis on which the comparison of languages is to be carried out. In the present case this means a definition of the directive speech act. In this respect, directives are similar to other speech act types in that they seem to occur in all the taxonomies suggested for speech acts. The difficulty arises when we consider on what basis they should be defined. Austin (1962) thought that a classification of speech acts (illocutionary acts) was possible on the basis of per-

formative verbs, such as ask, order, suggest, and that although there are over a thousand such verbs in, for example, English, a few basic types could be distinguished. Searle (1979:2) rejects Austin's classification and warns against equating illocutionary acts with illocutionary verbs because the verbs are language-specific whereas illocutionary acts are part of language in general, not of any particular language. Therefore, 'differences in illocutionary verbs are a good guide but by no means a sure guide to differences in illocutionary acts' and not a suitable basis for a general classification. Searle's own suggestion for a taxonomy is based on felicity conditions, i.e. the conditions that have to be fulfilled for the felicitous performance of a speech act. His taxonomy consists of five basic kinds of acts: (1) representatives, which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition, (2) directives, which are attempts to make the hearer do something, (3) commissives, which commit the speaker to some future action, (4) expressives, which express a psychological state, and (5) declarations, which cause immediate changes in the state of affairs.

The felicity conditions for directives, according to Searle (1979), are the following: the propositional content condition is that the speaker predicates a future act of the hearer, the preparatory condition is that the speaker believes that the hearer is able to perform the act, the sincerity condition is that the speaker wants the hearer to perform the act, and the essential condition is that the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to get the hearer to perform the act. It is these conditions that James (1980) suggests should be taken as the tertium comparationis for a contrastive analysis of this area. The problem with this is, however, that Searle's definitions and taxonomy can be and have been criticized. Levinson (1983:240), for example, is of the opinion that Searle's typology is not even built on felicity conditions in any systematic way and thus lacks 'a principled basis'. Edmondson's (1981) criticism is very much like that Searle himself directs to Austin's classification, namely that it relies on existing lexical items, that Searle essentially classifies illocutionary verbs, not segments of behaviour. Part of Edmondson's criticism concerns the fact that the whole philosophical approach to speech acts overlooks their interactive role, i.e. that the hearer's interpretation of the speaker's behaviour determines what the speaker's behaviour counts as at that point in the ongoing conversation' (Edmondson 1981:50). Others have expressed similar opinions: for example, Bach and Harnish (1979) point out that 'an

illocutionary act is communicatively successful if the speaker's illocutionary intention is recognized by the hearer'. Franck (1981) also emphasizes the fact that definitions of speech acts that are based on the speaker's intentions are not applicable to the analysis of real life communication. Thus, 'If one tries to apply speech act labels to natural conversation it soon becomes obvious that the accomplishment of those speech acts typically mentioned in speech act theory like requests, permissions, offers, invitations and acceptations of offers etc., is a joint and finely tuned achievement of several speakers' (Franck 1981: 227).

The analysis of the speech act value of utterances in real life communication is made more complicated by the possibility of their being indirect, i.e. the propositional content of the utterance does not as such suggest what speech act is intended to be performed; the speaker says one thing but means another. The hearer recognizes the speech act value of the utterance by drawing conclusions, not only from what the speaker has said but also from the speech situation. Thus the difference between direct and indirect speech acts can be defined as the former being interpretable outside the context, the latter being context-tied for their correct understanding (see eg. van der Auwera 1980). There are, however, people who, like Leech (1983), do not agree with the division of speech acts into direct and indirect but prefer to talk about degrees of directness or indirectness. According to Leech (1983:38), even the most direct speech acts (like Switch on the heater!) are indirect means of achieving a goal and even their interpretation requires some inferencing from the part of the hearer. Moreover, in the case of directive speech acts many of the indirect expressions have become conventionalized, standard ways of expressing this speech act, such as interrogative sentences that seemingly inquire about the hearer's ability to perform the act (Can you pass the salt? / Voitko an(ua) suola?). In the case of such standardized expressions, it must be true, as Bach and Harnish (1979:473) point out, that 'the hearer can recognize the speaker's illocutionary intent just as immediately as if a literal illocutionary act were being performed', that 'the identity of the speaker's illocutionary intent is the first candidate to be arrived at in the process of inference'. Thus, if the aim is, as it is in the present paper, to find out the conventional ways of expressing a speech act, there is no need for making a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. Yet, although indirectness as such is universal, the

conventionalized indirect expressions need not be and, consequently, there is need for a cross-language comparison.

Since the aim of this paper is not to carry out an analysis of conversation but to find out and compare the conventional expressions of the directive speech act in English and Finnish, the interactional role of the expressions is not essential for the definition of the tertium comparationis. Instead, the comparison can be based on an intentional definition of the directive speech act. Thus, the starting point could be the definition of directives given by Bach and Harnish (1979:47): 'directives express the speaker's attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer' and 'they also express the speaker's intention (desire, wish) that his utterance or the attitude it expresses be taken as (a) reason for the hearer to act'.

Directives, however, are a very large group of speech acts, particularly if questions are included in them, as is done by Searle. Their inclusion has met with criticism; Wunderlich (1979), for example, points out that almost all criteria that can be used speak against their inclusion. But even with their exclusion many people have felt a need for a subcategorization of directives. Fraser (1978), for example, distinguishes six subtypes on the basis of what 'sense' in the hearer the act appeals to. Thus, for instance, requesting appeals to the hearer's sense of mutual co-operation, whereas an appeal is directed towards the hearer's sense of moral obligation. Fraser himself expresses doubts about his subtypes and quite rightly points out that sentences often leave it open which type of directive is meant; it is often virtually impossible to know to what 'sense' in the hearer the utterance is supposed to appeal.

Green (1975) offers another suggestion for the division of directives, based partly on social, partly on linguistic criteria. The division is into orders, demands, requests, pleas, and suggestions. The giver of an order believes that he/she has authority and expects to be obeyed; an order has falling intonation and does not admit the addition of please. The giver of a demand does not have any institutionalized authority or circumstantial power over the addressee and not as much expectation to be obeyed. A demand has falling intonation and cannot occur with please. Requests, as opposed to orders and demands, are used by someone who has or who is acting as if he/she has no authority or power to compel compliance and will not be enraged by a refusal although expects the request to be granted. Requests also imply polite-



ness, which orders and demands do not. Linguistically they are - in English - characterised by a slightly rising intonation, whereas orders have clearly falling intonation. Requests permit the addition of please and an if you will tag. Pleas in their turn contain no real expectation of being granted, have a slightly rising intonation and allow the addition of please. They are made from the position of subservience. Suggestions do not show any special authority or subservience and the speaker does not care much whether the suggestion is carried out or not.

Green's subcategorization criteria are more concrete than Fraser's. Still, it is doubtful whether they are sufficient in recognising a particular subtype in actual analysis of data. They seem to leave too many problems unanswered. For example, there are no linguistic differences between an order and a demand, the only difference being that in the case of an order the speaker has authority and expects to be obeyed whereas in the case of a demand he/she has no real authority and the expectations for being obeyed are smaller. Furthermore, Green does not mention whether one criterion is enough or whether all criteria have to be fulfilled if an utterance is to account for example as a request. Or, does the fact that an imperative sentence allows the addition of please in some context, although it has not been used, make the sentence function as a request? It is likely that much more than some clear linguistic signs enter into play in actual speech situations, for example such para- and extralinguistic factors as the general tone of voice and facial expressions.

The relative statuses of the participants are even less clear indicators of subtypes than are the linguistic criteria. In situations in which the participants have unequal 'institutionalized' social statuses the person with higher status can act as if he/she had no authority and use a request instead of an order or a demand, without this making his/her position one of subservience. If the statuses of the participants are equal, on what basis can we say that one assumes an authoritative status and issues a command or assumes a subservient position and makes a request? The difficulty, in other words, is in knowing what assumptions the speaker has made about their statuses.

It seems, then, that no reliable criteria exist for a division of directive speech acts, at least not one that would be usable for contrastive analysis, because the criteria suggested are either too vague or rely on language specific linguistic features (eg. Green's criteria concerning intonation and the addition of please). In the type of cross-

language comparison envisaged here it is therefore better simply to look for the expressions of the directive speech act in general, without attempting any subcategorization.

The subsequent attempt at a comparison of the expressions of the directive speech act in English and Finnish then starts from the following assumptions:

(1) It is enough for a cross-language comparison of this type to define the speech acts on the basis of speaker intentions. In the case of directives, the speaker's intention is to get the hearer to do something, and we are looking for the expressions of this desire, wish.

(2) Instead of a division of speech acts into direct and indirect ones, it is more relevant to talk about different degrees of directness or indirectness, particularly since many of the 'indirect' expressions of directives are so conventionalized that their directive interpretation is 'the first candidate to be arrived at in the process of inference' (Bach and Harnish 1979:173).

(3) No division of the directive speech acts into subcategories is felt necessary, particularly in view of the fact that finding reliable criteria for such a division in two languages is very difficult.

The first part of the following discussion concerns the sentential form and content of the expressions of the directive speech act in English and Finnish. The division of the discussion follows the traditional division into three basic sentence types: imperative, interrogative and declarative, which all are used in expressing directives in both languages. The procedure followed is like the one suggested by James (1980): lists of possible realizations have been worked out on the basis of the tertium comparationis. Additional material has been collected from the scripts of a British TV serial and those of some Finnish radio plays as well as a couple of plays in both languages. This data has been supplemented by material found in studies on speech acts and material heard in real life conversations. Resorting to data of this kind is naturally not the ideal approach, for conversations produced by a playwright are not necessarily 'a strategic research site for the understanding of natural conversation' (Labov and Fanshel 1977:350). The ideal would of course be to collect recorded data of real life conversations in both languages. But to guarantee that all the possible expressions occur in the material the data should be very extensive. The material collected is analysed linguistically, paying particular attention to the sentential form, the polarity of the sentence (positive vs. nega-

tive), expressions of modality, the devices used for mitigation or enforcement of the illocutionary force.

### Expressions of the Directive Speech Act

Imperative sentences. - Imperative sentences are direct ways of expressing directives; the central function of an imperative sentence is that the speaker tries to get the hearer to undertake some action. Not all imperative sentences can, however, be understood as requests for action; this is true for example of jokes, insults and proverbs. If the speaker says to the listener, Drop dead, this cannot be taken as a directive because it does not fulfill the preconditions set for directives. Nor could wishes like Have a nice trip! or conditionals like Take one more step and I'll shoot be understood as directives (Labov and Fanshel 1977). However, in the majority of cases an imperative sentence is intended and also interpreted, even without a context, as a directive both in English and Finnish.

English has only one imperative form of the verb; Finnish has two second person imperative forms, a singular and a plural one. The plural form is naturally used when addressing more than one person but also when addressing one person formally. The choice of the plural form in addressing one person indicates respect or a social distance between the speaker and the listener. Naturally there is nothing polite in the plural form itself but the social rules require its use in situations that demand manifestations of respect to the addressee, although at the present these social rules seem to be very uncertain and vary almost from person to person, particularly among younger generations.

English has the possibility of adding the auxiliary do to an imperative sentence (Do sit down!, Do come in!), of which Quirk et al (1972: 406) say that it creates a persuasive or insistent imperative. As Finnish has no formal equivalent of the English do, this type of an imperative sentence is not possible in Finnish. The Finnish imperative sentence can be made more persuasive or insistent through the addition of such words as toki, nyt, vaan, vain: Tule nyt sisään! is more persuasive than Tule sisään!

The force of an imperative sentence can be mitigated in English by adding the word please: Please, sit down/Sit down please. The addition of please is said to render the imperative sentence more polite, and, as was mentioned above, it has been claimed that its addition is a sign of the utterance being a request rather than a command. Goukens (1978) argues that please has a conditional meaning, that it is a lexicalization

of a conditional (eg. if you don't mind), and that by using it speakers make the fulfilment of their requests depend on the (good)will of the addressee. It would seem, however, that please could also be said to have the function of making the imperative sentence more persistent, i.e. be equivalent to the use of do, as in the following example:

Oh please, just spare me this sudden impulse of paternal instinct.

The Finnish equivalent of please is ole/olkaa hyvä, which in itself is an imperative form with the literal meaning of 'be good'. It can be added to an imperative sentence and renders the sentence more polite: Istu, ole hyvä/Ole hyvä ja istu! The literal meaning of this expression suggests that it, too, could be interpreted as an appeal to the addressee's (good)will, but in many cases it seems to be a mere politeness formula.

The English imperative sentence allows the addition of a question-tag, either positive or negative:

Make sure that the Southampton police know about this, will you?

For Christ's sake, hang on a minute, will you?

Hey, put some more ice in my drink, will you?

The question-tag is also a way of mitigating the force of an imperative, it seems to be the same kind of an appeal to the addressee's (good)will as please. Finnish has no question-tag that could be added to an imperative. Some kind of question-tags in Finnish are expressions like eikö totta and eiks niin but since they literally mean 'isn't it true', they cannot be added to an imperative sentence. In colloquial Finnish jooko can be used as a kind of question-tag with imperatives: eg. Tule tänne, jooko.

Finnish, however, has a device for mitigating the force of an imperative in the form of the clitics -han/hän and -pas/päs (-pa/pä or just -s in colloquial speech): eg. Luehan eteenpäin, Annahan mennä nyt, Lues tuosta, Pidäs nyt korran suus kiinni. It has been suggested that -han/hän makes a directive more polite and friendly (Nyky-suomen sanakirja). Hakulinen (1976), however, points out that the use of -han/hän is limited to directives whose fulfilment is not absolutely

necessary. Moreover, there is a social constraint to its use: it is possible only if the speaker and the addressee are closely acquainted or the speaker's social status is higher than the addressee's (Karttunen 1975, according to Hakulinen 1976). Similar considerations seem to apply to -pas/päs as well.

The English imperative sentence also allows the occurrence of the subject you:

You look after yourself.

These bottles, you get rid of them.

Well, you just crawl over to the bar and make yourself a drink.

Sure ... c'mon ... you sit by me.

According to Quirk et al (1972), these are commands which have an admonitory or finger-wagging tone and frequently express irritation. This does not seem to be true in all cases however. There is no finger-wagging nor anything irritated in someone saying to the listener: Sure ... c'mon ... you sit by me. Sometimes this subject has the function of singling out the addressee or is a means of expressing contrast ('you, not me'), as in the following dialogue:

A: Go answer the door.

B: You answer it. .

A: Get to that door, you.

The first you could be said to express the you-not-me-contrast whereas in the second case you is a vocative. The vocative can be distinguished from the imperative subject by the fact that it can change its position in the sentence, which the subject cannot do. Another difference is in the intonation pattern: when placed initially, the vocative has a separate tone-unit, which the subject has not, it only has an ordinary word-stress (Quirk et al 1972:403). The imperative sentence with a subject can also be easily confused with a declarative sentence with you as the subject since there is no difference in the form of the verb except in the case of the verb be (You be quiet!). Quirk et al (1972: 404), however, point out that 'it is the unstressed subject of the statement that distinguishes it formally from the command, since the subject of a command is always stressed, even if a pronoun'. The

function of the declarative sentences that can be confused with the imperative sentences is that of an instruction, for example street directions: You go up there until you reach the bridge, then you turn right ... (Quirk et al 1972:404). Without knowing how the playwright has meant the subject to be stressed it is impossible to know whether the following should be taken as an imperative sentence or as a declarative sentence functioning as an instruction:

A. I want my husband! I want a drink!

B. Well, you just crawl to the bar and make yourself one.

In Finnish this dilemma of whether a sentence is imperative or declarative does not arise since the verb shows the difference by getting a person suffix in a declarative sentence. Besides, Finnish imperative sentences cannot have a subject, at least not in the initial position: \*Sinä istu viereeni. Sinä is possible, however, if it follows the verb: Istu sinä viereeni. But this sinä certainly singles out the addressee or expresses a contrast ('you and nobody else' or 'you but not me'):

Lue sinä sillä aikaa lehteä kun minä kirjoitan tämän loppuun.

(You read the paper while I finish writing this.)

Thus, the subject in the Finnish imperative sentence does not function in the same way it does in English.

Interrogative sentences. - Interrogative sentences are also a common device used in expressing directives in both English and Finnish. In English these 'whimperatives' contain a modal auxiliary; a yes/no question without a modal is not possible as a directive: \*Do you check the drinks, please? The usual modals in whimperatives are will and can and their preterite forms would and could. Both positive and negative sentences are possible as is also the addition of please:

Will you check the drinks, please?

Would you now go and register, please?

Could you put me through to Mrs Helen Millmoss, please?

Couldn't you try to see it that way?

Of the other modals may/might cannot occur in whimperatives, neither in positive nor in negative form. Sentences like the following could not be interpreted as directives:

May/might you close the window?

Mayn't/mightn't you close the window?

An exception to this rule are the permission directives like May I have my drink, please?, which look like requests for permission to do something but can also function as requests for the listener to act, depending on the context. Interrogative sentences containing must, like Must you close the window? function as a device of getting the addressee not to carry out something that he/she intends to do. The negative Mustn't you close the window? could possibly be taken as a directive, i.e. the speaker is making a request of information about the listener's obligation to perform the act. Similar considerations apply to should and shouldn't: Should you open the window? suggests that the addressee should not perform the act, whereas Shouldn't you open the window? suggests that he/she should perform the act specified in the sentence. Shall and shan't on the other hand are not possible in whimperatives.

In Finnish the modal verb voida ('can') occurs frequently in whimperatives, either in the indicative or, more frequently, in the conditional form; both positive and negative forms are possible:

Voitko ojentaa minulle tuon lehden?

(Can you give me that paper?)

Voisitko yrittää olla ihan kunnolla?

(Could you try to behave yourself?)

Eksä vois kuitenkin puhua sille?

(Couldn't you talk to him?)

Finnish has no modal verb whose functions could be compared with those of the English will. Although an English interrogative like Will/ would you check the drinks? can be interpreted as an inquiry about the addressee's willingness to carry out the act, verbs like tahtoa and haluta ('want, desire') in Finnish are too strong as equivalents of will. Since will is also an auxiliary expressing futurity, interrogatives with

- will could also be interpreted as questions about a future activity of the addressee used as directives. In that case their equivalents in Finnish would be interrogatives without any modal verb, with the verb either in the indicative or conditional form:

Tuletko nyt minun kanssani vähän katsomaan tätä luokkaa?  
(Will you come with me now to look at this classroom?)

Ja ajattelsitko vähän sitä, mitä minä sanoin?  
(And would you think a little bit of what I said?)

The negative form also functions as a directive, particularly if it is in the conditional:

Etkö tulisi minun kanssani katsomaan tätä luokkaa?  
(Wouldn't you come with me to look at this classroom?)

It is interesting to note that although the interrogatives are generally milder, more polite as directives than the imperative, questions like Pääsetkö alas sieltä? (Can you come down from there?), Menetkösi sieltä? (Will you go away?) can function in Finnish as very strong commands, almost like threats, which the corresponding English sentences never could. In these cases, however, intonation and the tone of voice play an important part.

Of the other Finnish modal verbs pitää and täytyä function very much like their English counterparts must, shall/should: the positive sentences with these verbs in the indicative (eg. Pitääkö/täytyykö sinun sulkea ikkuna?) function as attempts to make the addressee not to carry out the act, whereas the negative sentences, particularly if the verb is in the conditional, can be interpreted as directive:

Elkö sinun pidä/pitäisi sulkea tuo ikkuna?  
(Mustn't/shouldn't you close that window?)

It seems that also the positive form in the conditional could be a directive, particularly if the suffix -han/hän is added:

Pitäisiköhän sinun sulkea tuo ikkuna?



The English whimperatives with will/would and can/could allow the addition of please. Ole hyvä, the Finnish equivalent of please, being an imperative form, cannot naturally be added to whimperatives: \*Voisitko sulkea ikkunan, ole hyvä? does not sound natural. However, if the whimperative does not contain a modal verb, it is possible to add the phrase olla hyvä in the interrogative form:

Oletko hyvä ja suljet ikkunan?

(literally: Will you be good and shut the window?)

This cannot be done if the sentence contains a modal verb: \*Olisitko hyvä ja voisitko sulkea ikkunan?

There are some further expressions involving the use of interrogative sentences. The speaker can inquire about the addressee's willingness not only by using the modal will but also by employing main verbs expressing willingness, such as like or care, together with the auxiliary would:

Would you like to join me?

Would you care to amplify that?

Wouldn't you care to amplify that?

In Finnish the corresponding interrogatives with verbs like haluta and very frequently viitsiä are also used as directives:

Viitsisitkö selittää tarkemmin?

Etkö viitsisi selittää tarkemmin?

A usual way of expressing a directive in English is to ask what reason the addressee has for not performing the act specified in the sentence:

Why don't you shut up, you daft prat?

Look, why don't you come and meet me in the pub?

The equivalent sentence is possible as a directive also in Finnish although this strategy is not frequent in Finnish:

Tuolla eteishallin takana on pieni huone aivan tyhjänä, mikset ota sitä itsellesi?

(There is an empty room behind the hall, why don't you take it?)

Another type of interrogative sentence used as a directive in English is the idiomatic How about ...? How about closing the window? In Finnish the corresponding phrase could be Mitenkä olisi jos ...?, which can be considered a strategic equivalent to the English idiom: Mitenkä olisi jos sulkisit ikkunan? English also employs the interrogative sentence type in which the speaker asks if the addressee has anything against performing the act, which is comparable to inquiring about his/her willingness, this involves the use of the verb mind:

Do you mind not doing that?

Would you mind taking this to the post?

The direct translational equivalent of this type of interrogative would be Olisiko sinulla mitään sitä vastaan, että ..., which as a directive would sound ironic or almost like a joke: Olisiko sinulla mitään sitä vastaan, että veisit tämän posttiin?, i.e. it is not a pragmatic equivalent of the English interrogative.

**Declarative sentences.** - Declarative sentences can also function as directives in both languages. One of types of declaratives that can be used in this way is a sentence that simply states a future act of the addressee. In English this normally requires the use of an auxiliary denoting futurity; in Finnish the present tense form of the verb is used, as it is the most normal way of denoting futurity:

You will get up quietly then.

You are just going to ask Mrs. Riley to tell your sons ...

You will not say this!

Tänä iltaa sinä otat puheeksi sen holhousasian.

Kuule, yks juttu on selvä. Sä et enää jalallas astu sinne.

Lopetat, ilman irtisanomista. Otat loparit.

The force of this firm, demanding directive can be mitigated in English through the addition of a question tag:

You will get up quietly, won't you?

In Finnish this mitigating effect can be achieved through the use of the clitic -han/hän:

Nousethan sitten hiljaa ylös.

Another way of expressing a directive which also involves the use of a declarative sentence is stating that the addressee has the obligation to perform the act, which requires the use of a modal verb indicating necessity:

You must tell me all you know.

You shall do as I say.

You should make an honest woman of her.

In these sentences the preterite form should makes the illocutionary force milder than must or shall, so that the last sentence could be said to function as a suggestion as against the commanding or demanding force of the two others. Finnish exhibits the same possibilities:

Kuulehan, ensinnäkin sinun täytyy puhutella opettajaasi kohtellaasti.

This sentence is more demanding than the following, which has the conditional form of the modal verb täytyy:

Sinun täytyisi puhutella opettajaasi kohtellaasti.

A sentence in which the speaker expresses his/her want or desire for the future act of the addressee is another type of declarative sentence used as a directive speech act. This involves in English a verb like want, wish or be grateful with the future act expressed in an embedding:

I want you to look in the pig-skin brief-case, right?  
 I wish you'd just get out and let me go on with my packing.  
 I'd be grateful if you'd leave the house.

The Finnish material collected does not offer any examples of this type of declarative sentence being used as a directive, but there is no reason why a want-statement could not function as a directive also in Finnish. The following are likely candidates for directives in Finnish:

Haluan/haluaisin, että katsot siltä slannahkaisesta salkusta.  
 Olisin kiitollinen, jos jättäisit minut rauhaan.

Clearly directive in their speech act function are also declarative sentences containing a performative verb (eg. ask, insist), which clearly indicates the illocutionary force of the sentence:

I ask you all to raise your glasses and drink to the health of Jennifer and Edward.  
 Mutta sen vaadin, että tämän illan kuluessa hoidat valmiiksi puhutut asiat.

In both languages the performative verb can be preceded by a modal verb, which implies that the speaker feels under the obligation to require something from the hearer:

I must insist that you stay in bed.  
 Niin että minun täytyy nyt todella pyytää, ettette enää tule tänne.

In Finnish the directive speech act can be expressed by using a conditional clause without a main clause, a possibility that does not exist in English:

Mutta jos nyt sitten voisitte hommata Arin aina aamulla kouluun.  
 (Literally: 'But if you could see to it that Ari gets to school in the mornings.')

Jos koettaisit nyt olla oikein miesmäisesti ja rupeaisit yrittämään.

(literally: 'If you would try to behave like a man and begin to make an effort.')

It is difficult to explain the semantic content of this sentence type. It could perhaps be considered an elliptical sentence in which the main clause has been deleted. The underlying main clause could be something like 'It would please me/I'd be grateful', in which case the sentence could be described as a statement of the speaker's pleasure if the addressee will perform the act. Another version of this type of directive is a sentence like Entä jos koettaisit olla kunnolla, where entä means something like 'How about?'

Finnish has yet another expression used for the directive speech act which is not easily explainable either. This is a declarative sentence with a conditional form of the verb but without a subject (the second person is expressed in the personal suffix of the verb:

Ottaisit nyt edes jalat pois pöydältä.

('take-conditional-you now at least your feet off the table')

Siellä on vielä se rivitalo myymättä. Ottaisit sen.

('There's that row-house still unsold. 'take-condit.-you it')

It is noteworthy that if a subject is added to these sentences, they cease to be expressions of directive; thus, Sinä ottaisit sen ('you would take it') does not have directive force.

What Ervin-Tripp (1976) calls need-statements are also a sentence type that is declarative in form but can be interpreted as having directive force and occurs in this function in both English and Finnish:

I need a match/Tarvitsen (tarvitsisin) tulitikkuja.

I am in need of help/Tarvitsen (tarvitsisin) apua.

These can be general statements of the speaker needing something, like the examples above, or they could be directed to the hearer: I need your help/Tarvitsen apua. It is doubtful, however, whether these need-statements could be included in the conventional expressions of the directive speech-act; it would be more logical to describe them as

hints. Hints can be assumed to be a fairly universal way of getting the addressee to do what the speaker wants. Brown and Levinson's (1978: 218) definition of these 'truly indirect (off-record) speech acts' is that the speaker says something that is not explicitly relevant and thus he invites the hearer to search for an interpretation of the possible relevance. This might be accomplished by, for example, stating the motives or reasons for the desired act. A need-statement could be said to serve this purpose just as well as a statement like It's cold in here, which can be described as stating the reason for the act of closing a window. But hints are naturally so context-tied that no general description of the linguistic forms used in them is possible, although it may be assumed that they are often in the form of declarative sentences. Due to the nature of hints, background information is necessary for their correct interpretation, more than in the case of any other type of directive. They can therefore be described as the most indirect ways of expressing the directive speech act. But due to their nature, they are outside the scope of this study.

Summary of the conventionalized expressions of the directive speech act. - What has been said above can be summarized as follows:

(1) Both English and Finnish employ an imperative sentence in the expression of the directive speech act. This is the most direct directive in both languages. Finnish has two forms of the imperative: the singular form is informal, the plural form formal and more polite. Emphasising as well as mitigating the force of an imperative sentence is possible in both languages; the actual devices used in these are different. For emphasis English can employ the auxiliary do, Finnish uses such words as toki. Mitigation is achieved in English through the addition of question tags or please, in Finnish by using a mitigating clitic in the verb or ole/olkaa hyvä. Please and ole/olkaa hyvä, although they are often translational equivalents, function differently due to their different semantico-syntactic characteristics.

(2) In both languages a directive speech act can also be realized in the form of an interrogative sentence. The content of the interrogative sentence can be described as being an inquiry about

a. the addressee's ability or possibility to perform the act:  
Can/could you open the window?, Voitko/voitko avata ikkunan?, Would it be possible for you to open the window?

b. the addressee's obligation to perform the act: Shouldn't you open the window?, Etkö sinun pitäisi avata ikkuna?

c. the addressee's willingness to perform the act: Will/would you open the window?, Do you mind opening the window?, Viitsitkö/viitsitkö avata ikkunan?

d. the addressee's performing the act in the future, which in Finnish involves an interrogative sentence with a present tense or a conditional form of the verb: Avaatko/avaisitko ikkunan? In English interrogative sentences with will could possibly be classified here as well as in (c.).

e. the addressee's reason for not performing the act (Why don't you open the window?), which seems to be a fairly frequently used way of expressing the directive in English and possible in Finnish (Miksi et avaisi ikkunaa?), although not frequently used.

f. permission to perform the speech-act of requesting, suggesting, etc.: May I ask you open the window?, Saanko pyytää sinua/teitä avaamaan ikkunan?

g. In English the idiomatic interrogative sentence How about ...? has the illocutionary force of a directive although its content is difficult to describe. Closest to it in Finnish is the expression beginning with Entä jos ...

In both languages these interrogative sentences often involve the use of a modal verb, although in Finnish a sentence without a modal verb is possible (cf. (d) above). If the (modal) verb is in the past tense (English)/conditional form (Finnish), the directive is more polite. In both languages both positive and negative sentences are used in very much the same way. The addition of please and ole/olkaa hyvä is possible but again they function differently.

(3) Both languages also employ declarative sentences in the directive function. The content of the declarative used in this way can be described as being an assertion of

a. the future performance of the act by the addressee, which in English involves the use of an auxiliary (usually will), in Finnish the present tense form. Mitigation of the illocutionary force is possible: in English it is done through the use of a question tag, in Finnish by using a mitigating title.

b. the addressee's obligation to perform the act: You must/should open the window, Sinun täytyy/pitäisi avata ikkuna.

c. the speaker's desire/wish that the addressee perform the act: I want you to ... / I wish / I'd be grateful if you would ... / Haluan/haluan sin että ... / Ollisin kiitollinen, jos ... The Finnish conditional clause Jos sinä nyt + conditional ... could be included in this type, if it is interpreted as having a deep structure main clause like Ollisin kiitollinen ('I'd be grateful').

d. the speaker's performing of the speech act of requesting or his/her obligation to perform it: I ask you to ... / I must ask you to ... / Pyydän teitä/sinua ... / Minun täytyy pyytää teitä/sinua ...

e. Finnish uses a sentence type (Ottaisit sen), whose form and content are difficult to analyse: it has the conditional form of the verb but no subject.

The above list is by no means an exhaustive description of the ways in which the directive speech act can be realized in these two languages. Yet, it can be claimed that it describes the most frequently used, conventionalized expressions. The list does not include many of the expressions of directives (or requests) that for example Labov and Fanshel (1977) have found for English on the basis of their Rules of Request. Thus, they include in requests sentences like Have you dusted yet?, which they describe as a request for information about the existential status of the action, How would it look if you were to dust this room? and This room would look better if you dusted it described as referring to the consequences of the action, or When do you plan to dust? and I imagine you will be dusting this evening, which are references to the time of the action. Sentences like these should, however, be classified in hints rather than conventional, standard expressions, although they, no doubt, can function as attempts to get the hearer to do something. In the case of this type of sentences it is not likely that the hearer could recognize the speaker's illocutionary intent 'just as immediately as if a literal illocutionary act were being performed' (cf. p. 00).

As the above discussion shows, there is a lot of similarity between English and Finnish in the choice of the sentential form and content through which the directive speech act is realized. In each language there is at least one sentence type that is not used in the other. But most of the differences are due to differences in the grammatical structure of these languages: for example, the use of auxiliaries in English where Finnish uses the present tense of the main verb or the conditional form of the verb or in the different linguistic devices that the lan-



languages employ for mitigating or enforcing the illocutionary force. The results of the comparison thus seem to support the suggested universality of the 'strategies' employed in the expression of at least the directive speech act.

### Appropriateness of the Expressions

In spite of the great correspondence found in the sentential forms and contents of the expressions of a speech act, there might be differences between languages in which expressions are considered appropriate for given contexts, i.e. whether the corresponding expressions are felt polite or tactful enough, too polite or too impolite in the same contexts. There is nothing polite or impolite about any sentence as such, but some grammatical forms are generally felt to be more polite than others: it is felt that interrogatives used as directives are more polite than imperatives or declaratives, that negative sentences are less polite than positive ones, that sentences containing a conditional form of the verb are more polite than those with an indicative form, etc. In the discussion of indirect speech acts the general assumption seems to be that the reason for the choice of indirect speech acts instead of direct ones is politeness. There are, however, writers who do not agree with this explanation. Thus, for instance, Davison (1975) rejects politeness as a reason for the use of indirect speech acts. She sees them as signals of a disturbing topic in the discourse; eg. when indirect statements and questions are used, there is a conflict between the speaker's intention and the anticipated reaction of the hearer. Moreover, she points out that indirect speech acts can be used to express also anger and extreme rudeness (eg. I must say that I never want to come here again). Davison (1975:153) also suggests that indirect speech acts seem to be associated particularly with 'bad news, unfavorable opinions, and intrusive questions'.

There are thus difficulties in taking politeness as an overall explanation for the choice of indirect speech acts, or at least there are exceptions if there is a general rule of politeness. However, if politeness is defined in the way Brown and Levinson (1978) see it, most of the exceptional cases can be explained. Brown and Levinson see two aspects in politeness, which they call positive and negative politeness. These two aspects are connected with a property of the speaker which is called face, i.e. the speaker's public self-image, which also has a positive and a negative side. Brown and Levinson maintain that it is to everyone's advantage to try and save each others' faces by avoiding or

at least minimizing face-threatening acts. Politeness is one of the strategies used in face-saving. Since the negative face means the desire to have one's actions unimpeded by others, negative politeness is based on avoidance. The positive face in its turn means the desire to have one's wants desirable to at least some others, and consequently positive politeness is approach-based. Brown and Levinson (1978:134) state that negative politeness 'is the heart of respect behaviour, just as positive politeness is the kernel of familiar and joking behaviour'. According to them, the linguistic realizations of positive politeness often belong to the normal linguistic behaviour between intimates, 'where interest and approval of each other's personality, presuppositions indicating shared wants and shared knowledge, implicit claims to reciprocity of obligations or to reflexivity of wants etc. are routinely exchanged' (Brown and Levinson 1978:106). As the linguistic realizations of negative politeness they see conventional indirectness, hedges on illocutionary force, polite pessimism, and the emphasis on the hearer's relative power. The use of indirect speech acts when, in Davison's terms, a disturbing topic appears in the conversation could be explained as avoidance-based politeness. If there is, for example, a conflict between the speaker's intention and the anticipated reaction of the hearer, negative politeness would make the speaker avoid the conflict through indirectness. Similarly, it is also natural that the speaker would use the avoidance strategy of negative politeness in the case of bad news, unfavourable opinions and intrusive questions to save the hearer's face.

In the case of face-threatening acts speakers have, according to Brown and Levinson, a few basic strategies at their disposal. They can do face-threatening acts directly and unambiguously ('go bald on record'), resort to either positive politeness or negative politeness, or to go off record, i.e. express themselves ambiguously and thus find an 'out' of a difficult situation. Going on record can be described as following the Gricean Maxims of co-operation, going off-record as violation of one or other of the Maxims, which typically leads to indirectness. Thus, the use of indirect speech acts would be part of the off-record strategy. However, Brown and Levinson claim that the use of conventionalized indirectness belongs to the strategy of negative politeness, which is a result of a compromise between a desire to go on record and a desire to avoid a face-threatening act, i.e. to go off record. A conventionalized indirect speech act is unambiguous in the context and cannot be interpreted through its literal meaning, and yet,

with it speakers can also express their desire to go off record. For example, in a situation where it is clearly desirable that the door should be shut, an interrogative sentence like Can you shut the door? can only be interpreted as a request, and yet, it is also an inquiry after the hearer's ability to perform the act and thus off record. It is obvious that a face-threatening act can be done bald on record if, for example, the desire for efficiency is great or the speaker's desire to save the listener's face is small, or the speaker wants to be rude, or if the act, in spite of its threatening quality, is in the listener's interest, etc.

The conventionalized indirect expressions for the directive speech act discussed in this paper would thus be part of negative politeness, the most direct directives, i.e. imperative sentences, would mean going bald on record, and hints would belong to the strategy of going off record. Surprisingly, however, indirect suggestions like Why don't you lend me your cottage for a weekend? are, according to Brown and Levinson (1978:133), a conventionalized positive politeness form. The idea of positive politeness seems to be the weakest link in their system: sometimes the inclusion of a particular strategy in positive rather than negative politeness is not really motivated.

The most interesting and useful part of Brown and Levinson's theory from our point of view is the way they explain the weightiness of a face-threatening act. The seriousness of a threat to face can be calculated on the basis of three sociological variables: the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, their relative power, and the ranking of impositions in a particular culture. Cultures can differ as to the effect of these variables on linguistic behaviour. Thus, the same distance or the same power relationship between participants may vary in its effects in different cultures and lead to different requirements of tactfulness. Similarly, the imposition of an act may be assessed differently.

Brown and Levinson's theory seems to suggest, then, that in the assessment of the politeness value of the various expressions of a speech act we would have to consider the influence of the above mentioned variables on the suitability of the expressions in different situations. This would mean the study of speakers' linguistic behaviour in situations in which the three factors would vary, which would necessitate the collection of a great amount of data. It seems, however, that some kind of assessment could also be achieved by simply creating a

situation in which the three variables are made as 'neutral' as possible and by asking native speakers to evaluate the suitability of the various expressions for that situation. This type of test was performed in order to assess the politeness value of the expressions of the directive speech act discussed above. A 'neutral' situation was created in which the participants were described as being not complete strangers but not friends either with no dominance relationship between them. The speaker's request concerned the opening of a window in a hot and stuffy room, an act that could be considered as advantageous not only to the speaker but also to the addressee. Moreover, it was an act which the speaker could not perform whereas the addressee could.

According to native speaker evaluations, the 'neutral' context leads in both English and Finnish to the use of an interrogative sentence, rather than an imperative one. Native speakers of English seem to feel, though, that the imperative would be suitable 'with the right kind of intonation', particularly if please were added. Speakers of Finnish do not consider the imperative polite enough in this context, not even with the addition of ole/olkaa hyvä. In Finnish, the interrogative sentence that seems neither too polite/formal nor too impolite contains a conditional form but not necessarily a modal verb. In English the most favoured interrogative sentence type seems to be the one that inquires about the hearer's ability or willingness to perform the act, with a modal auxiliary in the past tense form. About the suitability of the other interrogative sentence types there is not that much agreement. The addition of a negative to the interrogative sentences gives them an additional meaning of impatience and thus renders them less polite. Thus, also the expression that inquires about the hearer's reasons for not performing the act, i.e. Why don't you open the window? in English, is not suitable for this context; in Finnish it is considered 'odd'. A difference between the languages is that speakers of English consider an interrogative that asks for permission to perform the speech act of requesting (Could I ask you to open the window?) suitable for this context whereas the corresponding Finnish expression is considered too polite.

Among the declarative sentences used as directives, those that state the future performance of the act (You will open that window/Sinä avaat tuon ikkunan), that state the addressee's obligation to perform the act and those that state the speaker's desire (I want you to .../Haluan, että ...) are felt to be too 'aggressive', thus too impo-

lite for this context in both languages, whereas those that express the speaker's gratefulness (I'd be grateful if .../Olisin kiitollinen, jos ...) are too polite or formal for the neutral situation. The declarative sentences that contain a performative verb of requesting (I ask/I must ask you to ..., Pyydän/minun täytyy pyytää sinua ...) are again too aggressive, i.e. not polite enough or felt to be too formal by some; in Finnish, though, the addition of the conditional form (Pyytäisin sinua ...) makes the expression suitable for the context. The Finnish declarative sentence type Avaisit tuon ikkunan, for which there is no corresponding English expression, is definitely too impolite for this context.

It can be assumed, then, that a change in any of the three social variables could cause a change in the choice of the expression. Thus, for example, if the imposition of the requested act becomes greater, it means that the expression has to be more polite, tactful. Or if there is dominance between the speaker and the listener, the dominating person can choose a less polite expression. Or again, if the participants are intimate friends or members of a family, i.e. there is no social distance between them, less tactful expressions (e.g. imperative sentences) are possible. If, on the other hand, the act is greatly advantageous or beneficial to the addressee, no particular tactfulness is needed and, for instance, an imperative is possible (e.g. Sit down, please/Istukaa olkaa hyvä, Help yourself, etc.; cf. Leech 1983).

The native speaker reactions to the politeness of the various expressions of the directive speech act seem to point in the same direction in English and Finnish, i.e. corresponding sentence types are felt to have similar politeness values in these languages. But to be able to assess the appropriateness of these expressions in different situations, we would have to know what importance the three social variables of dominance, distance and imposition have in the two cultures, i.e. we would need a comparison of the cultures.

ENGLISH PARENTHETICAL  
CLAUSES OF THE TYPE  
'I BELIEVE/YOU KNOW'  
AND THEIR FINNISH  
EQUIVALENTS


Parenthetical clauses, which have been defined as clauses containing information 'slipped into another context' (Urmson 1952:481), consisting of a first or second person subject and a verb in the simple present tense form (eg. I believe, I suppose, you know) are typical of English but do not necessarily occur in other languages; in Finnish for example they are very rare. They are problematic for traditional syntactic analysis because they are not independent sentences and yet are only loosely connected with the sentences within which they occur. It also seems that an analysis of their meanings on the basis of the verbs occurring in them is often irrelevant, which is seen for example in the fact that parentheticals with different verbs in them can be translated into Finnish in the same way. This would seem to indicate that their pragmatic function is more important than their propositional content. From the English-Finnish contrastive point of view they are interesting exactly because they cannot be literally translated into Finnish and because it is obvious that their translation requires an analysis of their pragmatic functions. Finnish does have parenthetical clauses, if by them we understand clauses which 'interrupt the grammatical unity of another clause' (Ravila 1957:481) but, as pointed out above, they are very rarely of the type first or second person subject + verb.

Perhaps because of the difficulty of their analysis by traditional means, the parentheticals have often been disregarded as mere hesitation phenomena. Yet, there have been some attempts to describe them from a syntactic (eg. Ross 1973) and semantic (eg. Urmson 1952) point of view. Lately, as pragmatic phenomena in general have gained a 'respectable' position as legitimate objects of linguistic analysis, the pragmatic function of parentheticals has begun to interest linguists (eg. Ostman 1981).

The syntactic analysis of the parentheticals has mainly concentrated on the syntactic relationship between the parenthetical and the main clause. Syntactically they seem to be classified into disjuncts or conjuncts (Quirk et al 1972) and 'somewhat loosely related' to the rest of the sentence. However, Quirk et al also consider the parenthetical clauses ('comment clauses' in their terminology) to be syntactically subordinated to the rest of the sentence. They say that to get from a sentence like I believe that, at that time, labour was cheap to the sentence At that time, I believe, labour was cheap one has to reverse the relation of subordination between the two clauses, making the that-clause into the main clause and the main clause into the comment


clause' (Quirk et al 1972:779). Ross (1973), however, is of the opposite opinion and argues that the parenthetical clauses must derive from structures that are superordinate to the superficial main clause, which is a result of 'slifting', i.e. sentence lifting. Thus Max is a Martian, I believe is derived from the following structure:

(1)



Moreover, Ross thinks that the output structure for slifting should resemble a co-ordinate, rather than subordinate, structure:

(2)



This treatment would seem to suggest that deep down these clauses that are called parenthetical are not simply additional information slipped into another clause but a more essential part of the content of the sentence.

Ross's treatment also suggests that the same deep structure (i.e. 1 above) could also give us I believe (that) Max is a Martian, in which the original superordinate S is the main clause of the surface structure sentence. One of the problems actually discussed in connection with these parentheticals is the question of whether sentences like Max is a Martian, I believe and I believe that Max is a Martian are really paraphrases of each other. Quirk et al feel that because of the reversal of the syntactic roles the sentences are 'not quite paraphrases', whereas Urmson (1952) seems to think that, at least in some contexts, there is virtually no difference whether the parenthetical occurs at the begin-



ning, middle, or end of the sentence, except perhaps stylistic differences. Thus, for him, the following are paraphrases:

I suppose that your house is very old.

Your house is very old, I suppose.

Your house is, I suppose, very old.

Urmson (1952:481) defines a parenthetical verb as a verb 'which in the first person present can be used... followed by 'that' and an indicative clause, or else can be inserted at the middle or end of the indicative sentence'. Thus, whether the first person subject + verb construction can be moved from the initial position to the middle or end of the sentence works as a test of the parenthetical use of the verb. This also means that there is no difference in meaning if the position changes. The same verbs are sometimes used parenthetically and sometimes not, when they are placed at the beginning of the sentence. Thus, as Urmson (1952:481) points out, in the following exchange between A and B:

A. I suppose that your house is quite old.

B. Well, I suppose that it is very old.

the latter I suppose is not used parenthetically. Urmson attempts to describe what distinguishes the parenthetical use of these verbs from their other uses in terms of certain characteristics: (1) parenthetically used verbs do not describe psychological states although in a wide sense they are psychological verbs; (2) when using a parenthetical verb the speaker makes a claim that the statement is true, although the claim is not very strong, particularly since some of these verbs are used to weaken the claim to truth; (3) like certain adverbs, parenthetical verbs orient the hearer towards the statement, helping to place it 'aright against the emotional, social, logical, and evidential background' (Urmson 1952:491). Although these characteristics certainly pick up some of the essential facts about the use of parentheticals, they are much too vague as a means of recognizing when a verb in the initial position is used parenthetically and when not.

Quirk et al (1972:779) suggest a more concrete way for distinguishing a comment/parenthetical clause from a main clause, i.e. intonation:

COMMENT You know, I think you're wrong.

You know, I think you're wrong.

MAIN You know (that) I think you're wrong.

The thick vertical line indicates the end of a tone unit, i.e. if there is a comment clause, the sentence has two tone units; in the case of a main clause the sentence is pronounced with one tone unit.

The two most frequently used parentheticals with a second person subject are you know and you see. The problems in their syntactic treatment are the same as those with parentheticals with a first person subject. You know, however, is a special case in that it also occurs in a question form, attached to questions, eg. Is he going do you know? or Where is he going do you know?, as does also do you think? According to Mittwoch (1979), these question parentheticals all follow the main question without a pause and usually form with it one tone unit, whose nucleus is the main clause; they differ in this respect from the parentheticals attached to a declarative clause, which were said to belong to different tone units with the main clause. Mittwoch also claims that if the order of the clauses is reversed, the result is not always a pragmatic equivalent of the question with a parenthetical, i.e. Do you know if he is going? and Is he going do you know? are not necessarily pragmatically equivalent.

Thus, the syntactic treatment of parentheticals does not really reveal much about them, except two opposing views about their relation to the rest of the sentence within which they occur. Before going on to see what their semantic and pragmatic analysis could reveal it is worth looking at the devices that can be used as their equivalents in Finnish, since, as pointed out above, their literal translations are rarely possible in Finnish. Below is a list of some of the most common English parentheticals and examples of their possible translations into Finnish:

### I believe

1. He travelled a fair amount, I believe.

Hän matkusteli laajalti luultakseni.

Hän ka matkusteli laajalti.

2. He had high blood pressure, I believe.

Hänellä oli käsitettäväkseni korkea veronpaine.

3. No. She died. Out here, I believe.

Ei, vaimo kuoli. Luullakseni juuri täällä.

4. But he took some stuff for it, I believe ...

Mutta hän käytti luultavasti joitakin lääkkeitä ...

Mutta hän taisi käyttää joitakin lääkkeitä ...

### I suppose

1. It would be, I suppose, some time about 8.30.

Luultavasti siinä kello 8.30.

2. What do you want - a subscription, I suppose.

Mitä te haluatte - rahaa johonkin keräykseen varmaankin.

tietysti.

3. He's been with Mr Rafiel a long time, I suppose?

Hän on kai ollut herra Rafiellin palveluksessa kauan aikaa?

### I think

1. She ought to see a doctor, I think.

Mielestäni hänen pitäisi mennä lääkäriin..

Minusta

2. What was your chap's name? - Can't remember. Robinson I think.

En jaksa muistaa. Luultavasti Robinson.

Robinson tai joku.

### I understand

1. He's a Cuban, I understand.

Käyttääkseni hän on kuubalainen.

2. Mrs K. found her, I understand?

Rouva K. löysi hänet, ninhän?

vai kuinka?

I expect

1. Hotel food isn't quite what you're used to at home, I expect.

Hotellin ruoka on aluksi varmaan outoa, vai kuinka?

Hotellin ruoka taitaa olla vähän outoa kotiruokaan verrattuna.

I wonder

1. Does anything ever happen here, I wonder?

Tuumin vain, tapahtuukohan täällä koskaan mitään.

Tapahtuukohan täällä koskaan mitään?

2. Where is Mrs. Dyson, I wonder.

Missä hän rva Dyson mahtaa olla?

I know

1. It's all a great strain on you I know, Tim, but ...

Tiedän, että tämä kaikki on teille kovin raskasta ...

Tietysti tämä kaikki on teille kovin raskasta ...

I gather

1. They didn't, I gather, get on very well together.

Arvelen, etteivät he sopineet oikein hyvin yhteen.

Käsittääkseni he eivät sopineet oikein hyvin yhteen.

He eivät kai sopineet ...

I am afraid

1. I have rather disappointing news, I'm afraid.

Pelkään, että minun täytyy tuottaa teille pettymys.

Minun täytyy välttämättä tuottaa teille pettymys.

I should say

1. No, she added. Definitely not married, I should say.

Ei, hän lisäsi. Et hän varmastikaan ole naimisissa.

I mean

1. Had she been dead long? When Mrs Kendal found her, I mean?

Oliko tyttö ollut kauan kuolleena? Tarkoitan ... kun rouva Kendal löysi hänet?

2. Does one know - I mean, does a doctor know - when a man has high blood pressure just by looking at him?

Voidaanko tietää - tarkoitan tietääkö lääkäri - milloin ...

Voidaanko tietää - toisin sanoen tietääkö lääkäri ...

3. What is the trouble - with her family, I mean?

Mikä sitten on vikana - nimittäin hänen sukulaisissaan?  
tarkoitan

As the above examples show, a parenthetical clause of the type 1st person subject + parenthetical verb, which in English can occur either at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the sentence, is hardly ever translated into Finnish with a similar clause. The only cases in which such a clause, placed in the middle or at the end of the sentence, is a natural equivalent for an English parenthetical is tarkoitan as a translation of I mean:

Voidaanko tietää - tarkoitan, tietääkö lääkäri milloin ...

\* Does one know - I mean, does a doctor know ...

In the following, however, the use of luulisin at the end of the sentence as a translation for the English I imagine is unnatural:

Se ei koskaan merkitse hänelle mitään, luulisin.

It doesn't really mean much, I imagine.

If a clause is used in Finnish, it is made into a main clause, placed at the beginning of the sentence and followed by an että-clause (that-clause):

It's all a great strain on you I know, Tim, but ...

Tiedän että tämä kaikki on teille hyvin raskasta ...

I have rather disappointing news, I'm afraid ...

Pelkäänpä, että minun täytyy tuottaa teille pettymys...

In most cases, however, the most natural equivalent in Finnish is an adverbial like luultavasti ('presumably'), varmaan ('probably') or an infinitival construction like luullakseni, tietääkseni, ymmärtääkseni, which consist of the translative case of the longer form of the first infinitive with a possessive suffix attached to it. These are usually considered syntactically to be abridged clauses ('lauseenvästike') of the kvantum-type, corresponding to full clauses like 'as far as I know, understand' (eg. Ikola 1974). They can be included in sentence adverbials or adjuncts, more exactly in comment adverbials/adjuncts ('selvittelylisäke' in Ravila's 1957 terms), which denote the speaker's attitude towards the truth or origin of the proposition expressed in the sentence (Ravila 1957, Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979). Hakulinen and Karlsson (1979:206) also point out the obvious affinity between these adverbials and moods and other modal elements. Interestingly, Urmson (1952) also compares the English parenthetical clauses with sentence adverbials, which are 'quite as loosely attached to sentences as are parenthetical verbs' (Urmson 1952:486). Their functions are also similar: they give warning of how the sentence is to be understood. Moreover, Urmson groups sentence adverbials and parenthetical clauses together into three categories: (1) those that indicate the appropriate attitude to the statement (eg. luckily, fortunately), (2) those that indicate how to take the statement in regard to context (eg. admittedly, consequently), and (3) those that show how much reliability is to be ascribed to the statement (eg. certainly, possibly).

A closer analysis of the Finnish translations of the English parentheticals reveals that the parentheticals in which the verb denotes belief or assumption, i.e. verbs such as assume, believe, expect, presume, suppose, think, understand, are most typically translated into Finnish with expressions formed from the corresponding verbs, i.e. the translative form of the 1st infinitive (luullakseni, käpittääkseni) or an adverb like luultavasti. Other possibilities are modal adverbs like kai, kenties ('perhaps') and the modal verb taida, for which the closest English equivalent is may:

But he took some stuff for it, I believe ...

Hän taisi käyttää joitakin lääkkeitä ...

What she said, I think, was that ...

Hän taisi sanoa, että ...

All these Finnish expressions seem to indicate assumption, like the English parentheticals. It does not make any difference which of the Finnish expressions is chosen as a translation for a particular parenthetical, which indicates that the meaning differences between the English verbs do not matter in the parentheticals. An exception to this pattern occurs in the translations for I think, which for example in the following case has to be translated with mielestäni ('to my mind') and not with any of the expressions mentioned above:

She ought to see a doctor, I think.

Mielestäni hänen pitäisi mennä lääkäriin.

This seems to indicate that I think can have a stronger meaning than mere assumption.

When the above parentheticals occur attached to sentences which, in spite of their declarative form, clearly function as questions, the Finnish equivalent is typically varmaan ('surely') or kai, rather than an expression like luullakseni, as in the following:

Your wife hasn't been feeling very well lately, I understand?

Valmonne ei ole kai voinut oikein hyvin viime aikoina?

Hotel food ... isn't quite what you're used to at home, I expect?

Hotellin ruoka on aluksi varmaan aika outoa?

You have had some rather exciting adventures sometimes, I suppose?

Tellä on varmaan ollut joskus aika jännittäviä seikkailuja?

The fact that the Finnish equivalents for the English parentheticals are in most cases sentence adverbials or modal verbs suggests that the

parentheticals containing the subject I and a verb denoting belief or assumption should be looked at as part of the modality of the sentence in which they occur, on a par with modal auxiliaries and sentence adverbials. This is actually referred to by Lyons (1977:847) in his discussion of what he calls the expression of 'the modal operator poss in the neustic position'. He says that it can be realized in the utterance-signal in various ways, eg. by grammatical mood, modal verbs, by prosodic and paralinguistic modulation, by parenthetical clauses like I think. What the speaker does with these signals is to 'subjectively qualify his commitment to the truth value of a proposition that he is more or less confidently putting forward in any of these functionally equivalent ways'. The modality expressed with these signals is of the subjective epistemic type, ie. with them the speaker expresses his/her subjective attitude to the truth value of the proposition.

Lyons (1977:807) also points out that modal adverbials and modal auxiliaries often form 'harmonic combinations' in an utterance, ie. there is 'a kind of concord' between a modal adverb and a modal auxiliary (eg. He may possibly have forgotten.). This could also be called a 'double realization of a single modality'. Coates (1983) brings into this also the parentheticals which, like adverbials, enter into harmonic combinations with modal auxiliaries. There can also be non-harmonic combinations as in Certainly he may have forgotten, in which the adverb and the modal auxiliary are independent and one is 'within the scope of the other' (Lyons 1977:807). Since in the harmonic combinations the modal auxiliary and the parenthetical clause express the same degree of modality, the modal auxiliaries occurring together with the parentheticals in these combinations could be used as indicators of the otherwise difficult-to-define meanings of the parentheticals. The trouble is, however, that the same parentheticals occur with different auxiliaries in what Coates (1983) claims are harmonic combinations. Thus, according to her, for example I think occurs with both epistemic must and epistemic may/might and so do I suppose and I mean. Since the epistemic must conveys the speaker's confidence in the truth of the expressed proposition and may expresses the speaker's lack of confidence (cf. Coates 1983), the ability to occur with both makes it difficult to judge the degree of modality of a parenthetical. Co-occurrence with modals does not differentiate between different parentheticals either since they are able to co-occur with the same verbs. They differ in this respect from the modal adverbials, such as perhaps and certainly, which do not



occur in harmonic combinations with both may and must. Thus, Perhaps he must be at home by now is not a harmonic combination nor is Certainly he may be at home by now. The similarity in the co-occurrence with modals suggests that there is no difference in the degree of modality between the various parentheticals, a view which is also supported by the fact that, as pointed out above, many of them are translated into Finnish in the same way.

All English parentheticals of the first person subject + verb pattern do not fit into the translational pattern described above nor can they be said to denote modality, i.e. the speaker's attitude to the truth value of the proposition. Thus, for example, I know, I mean, I wonder cannot be said to denote the speaker's certainty or uncertainty of the expressed proposition in the following examples:

It's all a great strain on you I know, Tim, but ...  
Onhan tämä kaikki tietysti kovin raskasta tälle Tim, mutta ..

Does anyone know - I mean, does a doctor know - when a man has high blood pressure just by looking at him?  
Voidaanko tietää - tarkoitan tietääkö lääkäri, milloin ...

Does anything ever happen here, I wonder?  
Tapahtuukohan täällä koskaan mitään?

Where is Mrs. Dyson, I wonder?  
Missähän rouva Dyson mahtaa olla?

Of these three parentheticals I know denotes the speaker's concession to the addressee, a kind of an agreement with the addressee's supposed, if not expressed, opinion. This is clearly the meaning of its Finnish translation as well, both of tietysti ('naturally') and the particle -han, one of whose basic meanings is concession (Hakulinen 1976). I mean denotes that a correction of previous information or an addition to it is intended. This is the only case in which a natural translation into Finnish is also a parenthetical clause tarkoitan. Other possible translations would be toisin sanoen ('in other words') and perhaps nimittäin ('namely').

I wonder seems to occur with questions and cannot therefore have anything to do with the speaker's commitment to the truth value of the

proposition. What it can be said to denote, in the above examples at least, is doubt or suggestion that the answer to the question expressed will be negative or that the question is a rhetorical one. The Finnish equivalent is the particle -han/hän, or the modal verb mahtaa or both in a harmonic combination. This is in keeping with what Hakulinen (1976) says about the basic meanings of -han/hän namely that it can occur in a polite, modest question for which an answer is often even not expected.

There are other parentheticals like the three discussed above for which no general meaning can be given but which have to be treated separately, eg. I hear, which naturally denotes the fact that the speaker has heard the proposition from others. The Finnish translation kuulemma expresses the same:

He is, I hear, ill in bed.

Hän on kuulemma vuoteenomana.

The foregoing attempt at a semantic analysis of the English parentheticals and their Finnish equivalents reveals at least the following points:

(1) Among the parentheticals there is a group which can be said to express modality and could therefore be said to function like modal auxiliaries or sentence adverbials. Between the members of this group there are hardly any meaning differences, in spite of the individual meanings of the verbs occurring in them. This is also seen in the fact that they are translated into Finnish with the same sentence adverbials often formed on the basis of verbs corresponding in meaning to the English ones, ie. denoting belief, assumption and the like.

(2) The same group of parentheticals can, however, be used in a different way in declarative sentences which function as questions and in these the parentheticals can be described as asking for the confirmation of the addressee for the proposition. In this case they are also translated into Finnish slightly differently, normally with the adverbs varmaan and kai.

(3) In addition to the above mentioned clearly distinguishable group there are other parentheticals whose meanings cannot be 'lumped' together but have to be treated separately. These cannot be described as part of the modality of the sentence, at least not as clearly as the previous group. In some cases their meanings seem to derive directly

from the meanings of the verbs occurring in them (eg. I mean) but this is not always the case as is seen for example in the fact that I know seems to denote concession on the part of the speaker. These facts are also seen in the Finnish translations of these parentheticals.

(4) A general point which emerges from the attempt to analyse the meanings of the English parenthetical clauses and their Finnish equivalents is that any discussion of their meanings necessarily leads to a consideration of their functions. This is due to their meanings not being generally derivable from the verbs occurring in them although the meanings of the verbs seem to have some effect on how they are used. Thus, the parentheticals clearly form an area where the borderline between semantics and pragmatics - if indeed there is any - entirely disappears.

Within the pragmatic approach the parenthetical clauses have not been treated as a group but references have been made to them in different contexts, ie. they have been mentioned as examples of different types of pragmatic phenomena. The extreme view of some parenthetical clauses presented within pragmatics for example by Edmondson (1981) is their inclusion in what he calls 'fumbles', which 'function to plug speaking-turn-internal gaps, ie. they are used by a speaker (in part) in order to gain time' (Edmondson 1981:153). Thus, I mean can be described as the most frequently occurring fumble of the 'let-me-explain type', a speaker-oriented fumble which communicates the fact that the speaker is 'trying to communicate'. You know and you see belong to 'cajolers' and are hearer-oriented fumbles, which appeal for understanding. If for example I mean is seen as a pure fumble, its Finnish counterpart would not be the literal translation tarkoitan, as was suggested above, but a pure fumble like nlinku (a colloquial form of niin kuin, 'as it were'). Whether the other parentheticals could be seen as mere fumbles is not sure; at least Edmondson does not mention them. Moreover, he does not give a full account of even the fumbles that he describes as fixed formulae, which 'constitute in themselves neither interactional nor illocutionary acts, but are used in the performance of illocutionary acts' (Edmondson 1981:153).

Another way of considering the pragmatic function of parenthetical clauses is seeing them as belonging to hedges. As hedges they could either modify the illocutionary force of a speech-act or soften the assumptions about cooperation (Grice's Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relevance and Manner), as suggested by Brown and Levinson (1978).

According to them, 'ordinary communicative intentions are often potential threats to cooperative interaction'. When performing speech-acts we make assumptions that might threaten the addressee's face and thus it becomes necessary to hedge these assumptions, for example the assumption we make when promising something that the addressee wants to be done. Brown and Levinson also claim that conversational principles are 'the source of strong background assumptions about cooperation, informativeness, truthfulness, relevance, and clarity' and *they*, too, have sometimes to be softened so that they do not threaten the face of the addressee.

The hedges on the illocutionary force can be divided into strengtheners (emphatic hedges) and weakeners (those that soften or tentativize) although both 'indicate something about the speaker's commitment toward what he is saying, and in so doing modify the illocutionary force'. The parentheticals that are used in this function are those that contain a verb of thinking or believing (eg. I guess, I think, I suppose) and are all weakeners. The definition offered by Brown and Levinson for hedges is almost the same as is normally given for modality (eg. by Lyons 1977), which would seem to indicate that hedges and subjective epistemic modality are one and the same thing and the different names are only indications of 'a different approach to the same phenomenon. The connection between modality and hedges is also seen in Fraser (1975) article Hedged Performatives, by which he means performative sentences containing a modal or semimodal (eg. I must advise you to remain quiet, I might suggest that you ask again).

When the English parentheticals are used to weaken the illocutionary force of the utterance, their Finnish equivalents are adverbs of the type of, luultavasti, ehkä, kai ('perhaps') or a modal verb like taida rather than the more literal translations like käsitäkseni, ymmärtäkseni:

John went out, I suppose.

Jussi meni kai ulos/ Jussi taisi mennä ulos.

But he took some stuff for it, I believe.

Mutta hän käytti luultavasti/kai joitakin lääkkeitä.

Mutta hän taisi käyttää joitakin lääkkeitä.

The hedges on the Gricean Maxims 'emphasize' that the cooperative condition is met, or serve to notice that it may not have been met, or question whether it has been met' (Brown and Levinson 1978:189). Thus, hedges on the Maxim of Quality suggest that the speaker does not take 'full responsibility for the truth of the utterance'; hedges on the Maxim of Quantity suggest that the speaker does not give as much or as precise information as is expected; hedges on the Relevance Maxim denote a change in the topic and 'perhaps apologize for it'; and finally hedges on the Maxim of Manner comment on the manner in which a proposition is expressed.

When considered in the light of the Gricean Maxims, most of the parenthetical clauses considered above would seem to fall into the group of hedges on the Maxim of Quality, i.e. they could be seen as suggesting that the speaker is not taking full responsibility of the truth of the utterance. Again, these are the group of parentheticals which contain a verb of thinking or believing; their pragmatic equivalents in Finnish would again be adverbs like varmaan, kai or a modal verb like taitaa, rather than the more literal translations like käsittääkseni, tietääkseni, etc., which are too strong to be mere hedges. Thus, for example I expect in the following example can be considered a hedge on the truth value of the utterance, and its Finnish equivalent could be either varmaan or taitaa:

Hotel food isn't quite what you're used to at home, I expect?  
 Hotellin ruoka on aluksi varmaan aika outoa?  
 Hotellin ruoka taitaa olla vähän outoa kotiruokaan verrattuna?

The other parentheticals are harder to place among the hedges. I mean could be included in the hedges on either the Maxim of Quantity or the Maxim of Manner since it seems to signal that previous information was not precise enough or not altogether correct and that more precise or more correct information is to follow, as in the following:

Had she been dead long? When Mrs. Kendal found her, I mean?  
 Oliko tyttö ollut kauan kuolleena? Tarkoltan, kun rouva Kendal löysi hänet?

The function of I wonder as a hedge is difficult to describe. It is added to questions and cannot thus say anything about the speaker's commitment to the truth value of the utterance. Perhaps it could be described as a hedge on the Maxim of Manner, because it suggests that the question need not be taken as a real question.

As for you know and you see, Brown and Levinson (1987) include them in the hedges on the Maxim of Quantity (you know) and Manner (you see). However, it seems difficult to see them that way, if we consider them for example in the following contexts:

I've never been to the West Indies before, you know.

She thought it better to leave her time to recover.

'It'll be all right, you know', she said gently.

I don't know if I really believed him or not at the time.

But then, you see, the next day he died.

Their pragmatic function is much better described by calling them pleas to the addressee for cooperation, which is the definition of the basic function of you know given by Ostman (1981). It is obvious, Ostman (1981:18) says, that 'you know plays a very central part in ensuing cooperative interaction in a conversation'. This does not, however, explain its function fully, for it also qualifies the accompanying proposition in some way. A proof of this, says Ostman (1981:18), is the fact that it cannot be added to sentences with no propositional content, i.e. those that are instances of 'phatic communion' like How do you do.

Although we can describe the basic function of, for example, you know as an appeal to the addressee for cooperation, there is need for distinguishing subfunctions under this very general description. In the following context, for example, you know could be said to correct the views of the addressee; something in the speaker's intentions has been misunderstood by the addressee and he/she wants to correct the misunderstanding:

I am your father you know.

Mināhan olen sinun isäsi/Olenhan minä sinun isäsi.

Did he want to leave you? Evelyn shook her head. We've got two children, you know, she said.

Halusiko hän jättää sinut? Evelyn pudisti päätänsä. Meillähän on kaksi lasta, hän sanoi.

As the above examples show, the Finnish equivalent could in these cases be the suffix -han/hän, which is not possible in cases in which, you know signals a further explanation to what has been said before, as in the following:

She said there were all sorts of things on the bathroom shelf. You know, tooth powder, aspirin and after shave ...  
Hän sanoi, että kylpyhuoneessa oli kaikenlaista tavaraa. Nimittäin/kuten hammastahnaa, aspiriinia ...

We all have one great competitor, said Dr. Graham. Nature, you know.  
Meillä kaikilla on eräs suuri kilpailija, tohtori Graham sanoi. Luonto nimittäin.

The Finnish equivalent here is an adverbial signalling a following explanation, with the meaning 'namely'. The clause kuten tiedät could also be used as an equivalent in Finnish in cases in which you know signals assumption of previous knowledge on the part of the addressee and could also in English be described as meaning 'as you know' (cf. Ustman 1981:22):

Oh yes, but perhaps he forgot to take his pills, or took too many of them. Like insulin, you know.  
Niin, tai ehkä hän unohti ottaa pillerinsä tai otti liian monta. Sama juttu kuin insuliinin suhteen, kuten tiedätte.

You know, in the form do you know?, can occur also in questions as a down-toner. Mittwoch's (1979) explanation is that it signals that the speaker feels that he/she does not have the right to expect the listener to know the answer. She distinguishes it from the meaning of do you think used similarly, for which she gives the meaning that the listener is not expected to have definite knowledge, only an opinion. In both cases, however, the Finnish equivalent is the suffix -han/hän:

Is he going do you know?

Where is he going do you know?

Is he going do you think?

Where is he going do you think?

Both are translated into Finnish in the same way:

Onkohan hän lähdössä?

Minnekähän hän on lähdössä?

Mittwoch (1979:411) also points out that 'question parentheticals affect only the preparatory condition of the preceding speech act whereas statement parentheticals can affect the essential condition'. This she sees as an explanation for the greater restrictions on the verbs that can occur in these parentheticals and for their relative infrequency if compared to the statement parentheticals.

Like you know, you see can be described as an appeal to the addressee for understanding. Brown and Levinson (1978) include it in the hedges on the Maxim of Manner, which it can be said to be in the sense that it signals that a further explanation or specification is to follow. This is seen very clearly in its Finnish equivalents, which are adverbs like nähkääs/katsokaas (literally imperative forms meaning 'see' or 'look' with the particle -s attached to them) or nimittäin ('namely'). The function of you see comes in other words very close to that of I mean. Consider the following examples:

No, it's not like that at all. Because you see, at the end of the time it's not as though I'd just dozed off.

Ei se niin ole, ei ollenkaan. Nimittäin kun herään ei minusta tunnu yhtään siltä, että olisin torkahtanut.

Payment for being discreet isn't thought of as blackmail. You see, some of the people who stay here are the rich playboy lot.

Hienotunteisuudesta maksamista ei pidetä kirstytyksenä. Nähkääs jotkut asukkaamme ovat rikasta playboyjoukkoa.



The foregoing discussion shows that the English parentheticals of the I believe and you know type are items which have to be analysed pragmatically. Their syntactic analysis reveals only their being loosely attached to the sentence in which they occur, and their semantic analysis necessarily leads to a consideration of their functions. Many of the 1st person subject + verb parentheticals can be said to belong to expressions of modality and as such can also be seen functioning as hedges on the illocutionary force of the utterance or as hedges on the Maxim of Quality. Their Finnish translations show that for this group it is not significant which verb is used since the Finnish equivalents do not vary according to the verb in the original. There are, however, other 1st person + verb parentheticals in which the verb seems to matter. For these the Finnish equivalents are different in each case. These, too, can be described as hedges, but as hedges on the Maxim of Manner, not of Quality, and thus they are not part of the modality of the utterance.

The parentheticals with a second person subject (you know, you see) could also be described as hedges on the Maxim of Manner, if this is understood very loosely. But more clearly they are appeals to the addressee for cooperation. However, when looked at more closely, they turn out to have a variety of functions, which is reflected in the variety of their Finnish equivalents.

As a general conclusion it can be said that the Finnish equivalents of the English parentheticals are clear indications of the diverse functions which the parentheticals can have. The Finnish equivalents vary from literal clausal translations and infinitival constructions reflecting the meaning of the English expression to the particle -han/hän, for which it is impossible to give any clear meaning, and mere fillers or fumbles like niinku or tota. The answer to the problem of the interpretation of the English parentheticals seems to be then that they are anything between a clause with a clear propositional meaning and a mere fumble used by the speaker to gain time.

'THIS', 'THAT', 'IT'

VS.

'TĀMĀ', 'TUO', 'SE'

The demonstrative pronouns, this and that in English and their Finnish counterparts tämä and tuo, belong to deictic expressions, which serve to connect what the speaker is saying to his centre of orientation. This in turn can be described as being constituted by 'his person, his position in space and time, his consciousness and his emotions' (Rauh 1981:13). The task of the demonstrative pronouns is to 'point' to objects in the real world: this and tämä 'point' to something that is close to the speaker, that and tuo to objects further away from the speaker, i.e. there is a proximal vs. distal opposition between the two pronouns. In both languages, however, the pronouns have other uses in addition to the purely deictic, 'pointing' one. Although it has been claimed (eg. Lakoff 1974) that the same principle that governs their spatial deictic use, i.e. the proximal vs. distal opposition, should also be able to explain their other uses, it is in many cases difficult to see how this could be possible. There are for example cases in which there is no this-that opposition in English, i.e. contexts in which only one of them can occur, and other cases in which both can occur with hardly any difference between them. The same is true also of the Finnish pronouns. Altogether, the rules that govern their use in both languages seem to be so complex that this article will only discuss some particularly interesting points and try to bring out some of the differences between the two languages.

Traditionally, two major functions have been distinguished for the demonstrative pronouns: deictic and anaphoric. The difference between the two is in Lyons's (1977) terms that deixis puts entities into the universe of discourse so that they can be referred to, whereas anaphora presupposes the existence of the referent in the universe of discourse. In anaphoric use the pronoun has an antecedent in the preceding text and refers to what its antecedent refers to, which, according to Lyons (1977:600), makes it possible to relate anaphora and deixis. The link between the two can be seen in 'textual' deixis, which means that demonstrative pronouns as well as other deictic expressions can refer to linguistic entities in the co-text of the utterance without being co-referential with it, i.e. not referring to the same entities in the outside world. An example of this is the second that in the following exchange:

- A. That's a rhinoceros.
- B. How do you spell that?

The second that refers to the word rhinoceros but not to the animal. This 'pure textual deixis', as Lyons calls it, is often confused with anaphora though it is clearly different from it. However, the cases which are really between deixis and anaphora are those in which the demonstrative does not refer to the text-sentence nor to the referent of any part of it but to a whole preceding proposition or to a speech-act performed previously. This 'impure textual deixis' occurs according to Lyons (1977) for example in the following exchange:

A: I've never seen him.

B: That's a lie.

The two major uses of the demonstrative pronouns, deixis and anaphora, are thus linked through a third one, ie. textual deixis (whether 'pure' or 'impure').

It seems to be generally accepted that the deictic use of the demonstrative pronouns is the basic one and the other uses are, as it were, derived from it. It is generally further assumed (eg. Lyons 1977) that, within deixis, spatial deixis is the most basic notion and other types, ie. temporal deixis as well as textual deixis and anaphora, are related to it. To quote Lyons (1977:668): 'It is the notion of relative proximity in the co-text to the moment of utterance that connects anaphora and textual deixis with temporal reference and it is the more general principle of localization that relates temporal reference, in many languages at least, to the more basic notion of spatial deixis'. To these Lakoff (1974) adds emotional deixis, which should also follow the principles of the deictic use of the pronouns. As mentioned above, the decisive factor in the deictic use of the pronouns is the principle of proximity, ie. the difference between this and that, tämä and tuo is one between proximal and distal - or non-proximal as Lyons prefers to call it, and this distinction should then underlie their other uses as well. Seeing it as underlying for example the anaphoric use of the demonstrative pronouns is in some cases very difficult, as Lyons (1977) also admits. Some of these difficulties will come out in the following discussion.

In Finnish, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the demonstrative pronouns include a third member se, which according to some grammarians (eg. Setälä 1961) has a weaker demonstrative meaning than tämä and tuo. Other grammarians (eg. Siro 1963 and

Penttilä 1963) see se as belonging to both personal and demonstrative pronouns, although keeping the two functions apart seems to be virtually impossible. Penttilä (1963:510) for example says that if the reference material is not clear, se can be regarded as a personal pronoun, but the concept of 'clearness of reference material' itself is very vague. There is no doubt, however, that se is also used deictically as in the following example:

Minä otan tämän, ota sinä se ja jätetään tuo Pirjolle.

(I'll take this, you take it and we'll leave that for Pirjo.)

How se is placed according to the principle of proximity is very difficult to determine. It has been suggested that se refers to something that is further away from the speaker than what is referred to by tuo. Penttilä (1963:510) adds that tuo refers to persons and things that can be pointed at whereas se refers to something that could be pointed at but need not be pointed at because attention is already directed to it in one way or another. But this explanation does not clarify the position of se in view of the principle of proximity nor is it sure that se is further away from the speaker than tuo. There is no doubt, however, of the fact that both se and tuo are distal as compared with the proximal tämä and that se has to be brought into a discussion of the Finnish demonstratives.

In English the pronoun it, which is normally given as an equivalent for se, is considered to be the neuter form of the third person singular personal pronoun (eg. Quirk et al 1972), although historically it is related with that. It is true that it is not used deictically like the Finnish se, but in many other ways it resembles the demonstrative pronouns this and that. As a matter of fact, Linda (1979) observes that it and that are both used in reference to the same kinds of items, and Lyons (1975:77) points out that they are partly in complementary distribution and partly in free variation in particular syntactic environments. Furthermore, Halliday and Hasan (1976) are of the opinion that although it operates in the system of personal pronouns, it can be explained as being the neutral or non-selective type of the nominal demonstrative. Indeed, as will be illustrated below, describing the difference between the uses of it and that is as difficult as telling apart tuo and se in Finnish. All this seems to indicate that it should be included in a discussion of the use of the demonstrative pronouns in English, particu-

larly if we want to compare them with the Finnish demonstratives, among which se corresponds partly to that and partly to it, as will be seen below.

In what follows the purely deictic use of the demonstratives will not be discussed as such but the principles of proximity which are supposed to govern this use will be the starting point for a discussion of their other uses. Particular attention will be paid to the extent to which they are explainable through the proximal vs. distal opposition. The comparison of the two languages will in some cases begin with the English pronouns, in others the Finnish ones, the basic aim being to find out to what extent the two systems correspond to each other.

Both this and that have a function in which there is no possibility for the proximal vs. distal opposition to occur, i.e. there are contexts in which this is used but that is impossible and vice versa contexts in which that occurs but not this. MacLaran (1980) calls these uses of the pronouns 'asymmetrical'. They seem to be furthest of all from any connection with the deictic use of the pronouns.

The asymmetrical use of this occurs in contexts in which a new referent is introduced into the discourse. It can be even used discourse-initially, often with the there is/there are constructions:

There was this farmer from Ballycastle ... (MacLaran 1980)

There was this travelling salesman ... (Lakoff 1974)

It is noteworthy that this is unstressed here; if stressed, it implies opposition with that, which the introductory context does not allow. This 'presentational' this can be said to be used in place of the indefinite article here, i.e. the indefinite article is normally used in the presentational contexts, while the definite article would be impossible if the referent being introduced were totally new:

There was a farmer from Ballycastle and ...

There was the farmer from Ballycastle and he ...

The definite article is not a possible replacement for the presentational this in other contexts either, which is shown by the following example given by Lakoff (1974):

He kissed her with { this unbelievable passion.  
an  
\*  
the

The fact that the presentational this cannot be replaced by the definite article proves that in this function this has lost a feature which is essential to its deictic use, i.e. the feature +definite. In its deictic use this picks out a specific referent which is definite, while in the above example the referent is specific but indefinite. Lakoff (1974) points out that the presentational this is limited to colloquial use and would not occur in a formal context like the following:

There was { a  
\*  
this tradition in Ancient Greece that the Trojans  
were descended from Dardanus ...

and associates the use with vividness and a desire to involve the addressee in what is being said. Therefore she includes it in her emotional deixis. Through the use of this the referent comes closer to the addressee and thus it is possible to see a connection with the deictic use of this.

The corresponding Finnish pronoun tämä is not used in a presentational function. The Finnish translation of the following English sentence shows that this is treated as a replacement of the indefinite article:

At least he said it was given to him by this acquaintance who had told him the story about a man ...

Ainakin hän kertoi saaneensa sen eräältä tuttavalta, joka ...

Since Finnish has no articles, either no article or an indefinite pronoun (eräs, yksi) translates this in the above case. If tämä was used in the Finnish sentence (Ainakin hän kertoi saaneensa sen tältä tuttavalta, joka ...), the referent would not be indefinite but known and the following relative clause would restrict its meaning and could not be

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interpreted as extra information as the relative clause in the original English sentence can be. Similarly, tämä would make the referent known in the following context:

I was driving quite happily and then suddenly there was this funny rattle under the hood ...

Ajoin ihan rauhallisena ja sitten yhtäkkiä alkoi kuulua (tätä) kummallista rahinaa konepellin alta ...

It must be concluded therefore that the Finnish pronoun tämä cannot lose its feature +definite, which is possible in the case of the corresponding English pronoun.

The asymmetrical use of that occurs before a restrictive modifier, usually a restrictive relative clause. There is no opposition with this, i.e. this is not possible in these contexts:

Only attempt { those questions for which you know the answer.  
                  \* these

Here the alternative is the definite article: Only attempt the questions for which you know the answer. According to MacLaran (1980), that in this restrictive use can occur discourse-initially without reference to context but the relative clause is vital to the establishment of reference. As a result the restrictive that is definite but not specific unlike its deictic use, which is both definite and specific. The Finnish tuo cannot occur in the corresponding contexts, which have either no determiner or se/ne:

Yritä vastata vain (niihin) kysymyksiin, joihin tiedät vastauksen.

Tuo thus cannot lose its feature +specific. If tuo/nuo occurred in the above context, it would refer to specific questions and the following relative clause would not be restrictive.

Another function in which it is difficult to see the basic deictic opposition between this and that is the 'emotional deixis', even though Lakoff (1975:355) for example claims that 'there is a clear linguistic link between emotional and spatial closeness and distance', which is seen in the emotional use of this and that. Yet, according to her analysis, both



pronouns can establish emotional closeness between the speaker and the listener. The emotional use of this creates vividness through the idea of closeness. As was mentioned above, Lakoff includes the presentational this in her emotional use of this. In addition, Lakoff counts as emotional uses of this cases in which the speaker refers to something or somebody already mentioned but outside the discourse proper. 'The speaker's use of this links his present thoughts to the previous mention of the relevant item' (Lakoff 1974:347). Lakoff further suggests that its most natural use is with proper names which the speaker expects to be familiar to the listener, as in the following:

I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. This Henry Kissinger is really something.

This use differs from the normal discourse deixis in that the relationship to the familiar referent can be only inferential, i.e. the above example does not imply that Henry Kissinger has been mentioned before.

It is noteworthy that also the pronoun that can be used to create closeness although in its deictic use it is a distance marker. According to Fillmore (1971), that creates a kind of 'camaraderie' or 'solidarity' when for example a garage mechanic says to the car owner: That left front tire is pretty worn or it shows sympathy when a doctor says to a patient How is that knee? According to Lakoff (1975:351), an indication that some notion of camaraderie is involved here is that 'when a direction is sincere and given out of real desire to help, that may be used; otherwise not': Soak that toe twice a day is alright, but Shut that mouth! is not. In this case that is a substitute for the possessive pronoun your. The difference between your and that is that by using the former the speaker puts himself out of the picture but by using the latter he implies that there is some kind of relationship, even one of distance, between himself and the addressee (Lakoff 1975:352). Thus, through the use of that an emotional link is established between the speaker and the addressee. Explanations of this kind have to remain as mere speculations. What is certain however is that this could not produce the same effect in the above cases, for example How is this knee? or This left front tire is pretty worn would include a deictic reference.

In Finnish, it seems that tämä and tuo are not used emotionally in the way their English counterparts are used; instead se seems to have

this function, at least it is the most natural equivalent for both this and that in the above examples:

Lähi-itään näyttää tulevan rauha. On se Henry Kissinger' vaan aikamoinen.

Kuinkas se polvi jakselee?

It can even be used with a proper name in direct address to create 'solidarity' or express 'fondness', as in the following:

Tietääkö se Rajja mikä lintu tuo on?

Tämä and tuo in the emotional use would be too 'pointing', for example Mitenkäs tuo polvi jaksaa? would bring into mind a contrast with the other knee, i.e. 'that knee, not the other one'. As pointed out above, se is weaker in its deictic meaning than tämä or tuo and apparently for this reason it can be more easily used 'emotionally'. Se could perhaps be compared here with the intermediate demonstrative that occurs in many languages and which can be described as meaning 'that near you, that of yours' (Lakoff 1975, Rauh 1987).

The pointing quality of the Finnish tuo comes out also in its discourse use (this term comprises the uses which Lyons calls textual and anaphoric). If reference is made to a preceding proposition as a whole, tuo is normally used only when the proposition referred to occurs in the other interlocutor's turn:

- A. Joka tapauksessa hän kutsui teidät kotihinsa. Täällä kaupungissa ja myös maaseudulla.  
 B. Miksei. Kyllä tuo totta on.  
 (A. In any case he invited you to his home. Here in town and also in the country.  
 B. Yes, I suppose that's true.)
- A. Eivät kaikki ole yhtä onnellisessa asemassa kuin te.  
 B. Tuo on totta.  
 (A. Not everybody is as lucky as you.  
 B. That is true.)

In other cases in which English has that referring to a previous proposition Finnish prefers se, as in the following contexts:

It had looked like a faceless apparition. But that was because the face was black.

Olento oli todella näyttänyt kasvottomalta aaveelta, mutta se johtui siitä, että kasvot olivat mustat.

In English that rather than it is used in references to a preceding proposition. This is supported by the findings by Linde (1979:344), who says that 'in all of the instances of reference to a preceding statement taken as a statement, the reference is accomplished with that rather than it or any other form'. However, also this and tämä seem to be possible in references to previous propositions, as can be seen in the following:

Old ladies were given to a great deal of rambling conversation. People were bored by this, but ...

Varatuomari Elo oli kauppaneuvoksen suurien asioiden juristi ... Mutta tämä ei vielä riittänyt.

Whether there is any difference between this and that in English and tämä and se in Finnish in these references to propositions is difficult to tell. In the above examples they would seem to be in free variation, unless the 'emotional' differences mentioned above can be used as explanations, i.e. this suggests emotional closeness and that distance. According to Halliday and Hasan (1976:60), this works partly in dialogue: 'in dialogue there is some tendency for this to refer to something the speaker has said himself and that to refer to what the interlocutor has said.' But otherwise the proximity principle does not have much effect, unless it is of the emotional type. The only clear difference is that in forward reference (cataphora) only this is possible and not that:

And I'll tell you this in plain Bible terms, the guilt that weighs on you is the guilt of adultery.

The same applies to Finnish; i.e. tämä is used in cataphoric reference:

Meidän lähtökohtamme on tämä: Maailmassa on liikaa epävarmuutta ja pessimismia. (Hakulinen & Karlsson 1979)

It seems that also it could be used in cataphoric reference but not the Finnish se, as is seen in the following English example and its Finnish translation:

I hate suggesting it - but don't you think perhaps she ought to see a doctor?

Minusta on västenmiellistä ehdottaa tätä - mutta etkö ole sitä mieltä, että hänen pitäisi käydä lääkärissä?

The same difficulty of telling the difference between this and that concerns the real anaphoric use of the pronouns, i.e. the cases in which there is an antecedent in the preceding text and the pronoun is coreferential with it. No principle of proximity, unless it is of the emotional kind, can explain why this is used in the first one of the following examples and that in the second one:

He asked for his brown raincoat. He insisted that this was his usual coat during the cold winter months.

A. I hear you dislike his latest novel.

B. I read his first novel. That was very boring, too.

Se is again the most natural translation in Finnish, tämä and tuo would both be too emphatically pointing:

Hän pyysi ruskean sadetakkinsa. Hän väitti, että se oli hänen tavallinen takkinsa kylminä talvikuukausina.

A. Kuulin, että sinä et pidä hänen viimeisimmästä romaanistaan.

B. Luin hänen ensimmäisen romaaninsa. Sekin oli tylsä.

In English, too, it complicates the picture of the anaphoric use because it seems to be an alternative for that. There are some cases, however,

in which that is needed to bring out a contrast, in which it would not be emphatic enough, as in the following:

A. ... he'd told you a story about a kind of Lucrezia Borgia.

B. So he did. But that was quite a different kind of story.

In Finnish, tu would not be possible in the corresponding context, apparently because of its too pointing character:

A. ... hän oli kertonut sinulle jutun eräänlaisesta Lucrezia Borgia.

B. Niih hän teki. Mutta se ( tu ) oli kokonaan toisenlainen.

It is noteworthy that, in cases in which there are several subsequent references to the same item, that is used in the first instance and it in the others:

A. Oh! We're all worried.

B. You too? Because of Major Palgrave's death? I've left off worrying about that. People seem to have forgotten it, taken it in their stride.

The same principle seems to apply even when reference is made to a preceding proposition, i.e. that occurs in the first instance and it in the subsequent ones:

But these things aren't hereditary. Everybody knows that nowadays. It's an exploded idea.

Finnish uses se in both cases:

Mutta nämä seikat eivät periydy. Jokainen tietää sen nykyään.  
Se on vanhentunut käsitys.

Linde (1979) uses the notion of focus of attention in explaining the difference between that and it and concludes that there is 'a strong preference for that if reference is made to items which are out of the focus of attention and for it if reference is to items within the focus of attention'. Isard (1975) refers to a similar phenomenon but describes it

as that moving the point of reference and it being preferred for already mentioned items, which difference is seen in the following sentences:

First square 19 and then cube it.

is 'an instruction to perform both the squaring and cubing operations on the number 19' whereas

First square 19 and then cube that:

'tells us to cube the square, which has not been explicitly mentioned but has come to attention as the result of the first operation.' This principle would explain why, in the cases of several subsequent instances. In Finnish, two is not used in either case, se could be used in the first one:

Korota 19 ensin toiseen potenssiin ja sitten korota se kolmanteen.

In the latter case however, a noun would have to be used to make sure that reference is to the new item brought into attention:

Korota 19 ensin toiseen potenssiin ja sitten Korota tulos kolmanteen potenssiin.

There is a case in Finnish in which the anaphoric tämä has to be used, in which two and se are not possible, and in which the English this cannot be used: tämä occurs in references to a person who has been mentioned in the preceding text:

Tohtori Graham liittyi hänen seuraansa. Netti laski nouleensa pöydälle ja tervehti tohtoria.

Tämä sanoi heti ...

Dr. Graham came and joined her. She put her needles down and greeted him. He said at once ...

The meaning of tämä is 'the last mentioned person' and it is used to clarify that the reference is to the person mentioned last in the preceding text, i.e. the principle of proximity is relevant here. Since

Finnish does not distinguish sex in the third person personal pronouns, as English does, reference in the above example would remain ambiguous. Thus in Finnish, 'in cases where the use of a personal pronoun (se, hän) would lead to ambiguity the pronoun tämä can be used, with the meaning 'the last mentioned' (Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979:319). This is part of a more general difference between the two languages. In English neither this nor that can be used as pronouns to refer to human referents, in either deixis or anaphora, except 'in relational clauses of the equative type where one element is supplying the identification of others' (Halliday and Hasan 1976:63):

Do you want to know the woman who designed it?

That was Mary Smith.

Finnish does not have this restriction, which is seen in the common colloquial use of tämä and tu in spatial deixis to refer to human referents present in the speech situation: eg. Tämä/tuo sano niin (This/that (person) said so.) Parallel to this is also the very frequent use of se in reference to human beings in colloquial speech instead of the third person personal pronoun hän.

In most of the cases discussed above the demonstratives have been used as independent pronouns, except in the discussion of emotional deixis. Similar considerations apply to this and that and in Finnish tämä, tu and se when used as determiners, i.e. the proximal-distal opposition does not explain their use. It seems that the English this and that are used without any apparent difference between them simply to indicate that the NP has a known referent, that it has been referred to previously although not mentioned in the immediate context. In most cases the definite article could be used in the same function; in all the examples below the referent is not present in the speech situation nor has it been mentioned in the immediately preceding context but has been talked about before and is therefore known to both the speaker and the listener:

I thought you'd want to know about what my movements were when this wretched girl was stabbed.

She saw something, some puzzling incident, something to do presumably with this bottle of pills.

In both examples that or the would be equally possible. Similarly, in the following example, in which that is used, this or the could occur as well:

I didn't put that bottle of pills there and I don't know who did.

In the corresponding cases tuo or se and less frequently tämä are used in Finnish although no determiner is needed to indicate that the referent is known:

Luulin teidän tahtovan tietää, missä minä liikuin silloin, kun tuo tyttö raukka surmattiin.

Hän näki jotakin, jonkin ällistyttävän tapauksen, jotakin mikä liittyi tuohon pilleripurkkiin.

Minä on pannut sitä pulloa sinne onk'ä tiedä, kuka sen on sinne pannut.

Tämä would be too 'pointing' in the above cases and would indicate that the referent is present in the speech situation. Also tuo seems to be too 'pointing' in some cases, and then se is preferred, as in the following:

You haven't had any more of those dreams, have you?  
Onko sinulla vielä ollut niitä unia?

There are, however, cases in which Finnish requires a determiner, usually tuo or se, where in English the definite article is enough, because otherwise the referent could be interpreted as unknown. Thus, for example in the following it would not be clear without the determiner that the door in question has been mentioned before, i.e. the demonstratives function as substitute articles in these cases:

Could it have been Jackson who had come out of the door?  
Olsikohan Jackson voinut tulla ulos tuosta ovesta?



In colloquial speech the Finnish demonstratives are frequently used even when the definiteness of the referent would be clear without them and there is no need for 'pointing', as is the case in the following:

A. Mikä teos oli kysymyksessä?

B. Karl Marxin Manifest der kommunistischen Partei.

A. Niin, aivan. Enonnan harrasti tätä nykytaidetta.

Kunnon mies, epäilemättä. Kun ei ollut noita turhia ja huonoja tapojakaan.

That there is no need for a determiner showing definiteness is seen in the English translations:

A. Which book was it?

B. Karl Marx's Manifest der kommunistischen Partei.

A. Oh yes. Your uncle was interested in modern art.

A good man. Didn't have any bad habits either.

It seems, then, that in both English and Finnish the demonstratives are sometimes used 'needlessly' as determiners, i.e. there is no need for pointing but in English the definite article would be enough, in Finnish no determiner would be needed. If there is a reason for their use in these cases, it has to be looked for again in emotional deixis. Another possible explanation is that the use of the demonstratives helps create a feeling of colloquial speech.

As a summary of the preceding discussion the following points can be made:

(1) In their pure deictic use the English and Finnish demonstratives follow the same proximal vs. distal principle with the difference, however, that Finnish has a third pronoun se also used in deictic reference. It seems that tämä corresponds to this but tuo and se divide the functions of that. What the difference is between tuo and se is not easy to explain, but often se refers to something closer to the addressee whereas tuo refers to items further away from both the speaker and the listener.

(2) However, when dealing with the discourse deictic use of the English demonstratives it has to be included in the discussion since that and it come very close to each other in their discourse use. As a matter of fact, making a distinction between the two is as difficult as

describing the difference between se and tuo in Finnish. Some suggestions as to a difference between them can, however, be made:

(a) When reference is made to a preceding proposition, that is preferred to it. Here Finnish is clearly different as tuo is possible only if the proposition is part of the previous speaker's utterance. If reference is to a following proposition, this and tämä are used but that and tuo are not possible.

(b) In real anaphoric reference that brings out a contrast with other items and is definitely more emphatic than it, which is demonstrated by the fact that if reference is made several times to the same item, that is used in the first instance and it in the subsequent ones. In Finnish tuo is even more 'pointing' than that and consequently the neutral se is preferred.

(3) It is difficult to see how the proximal vs. distal opposition could explain the difference between this and that or tämä and tuo in their anaphoric use unless some kind of emotional proximity and distance are meant. The same applies even more clearly to these pronouns when they are used as determiners. In this use they often simply suggest that the item to which the NP refers has been mentioned somewhere previously and is thus known. The definite article would in many cases be enough in English. In Finnish, however, a demonstrative is sometimes needed as a kind of substitute article.

(4) The proximal vs. distal opposition is very vague also in the emotional use of the demonstratives this and that because both can be used to create closeness, although in different types of contexts. In Finnish the pronoun se rather than tämä or tuo is used emotionally, which is in agreement with the fact that also in other languages which have an 'intermediate' pronoun, this pronoun is used in 'emotional' reference.

(5) The English this has a use in which it loses its feature +definite. In this presentational use there is no possibility for an opposition with that, and in Finnish tämä cannot be used as its equivalent. In its turn that loses its feature +specific when used in a determinative function. In this case its Finnish equivalent is se and not tuo.

The overall picture - even though it is admittedly a vague one - which emerges from the above cross-language discussion, is that the Finnish demonstratives tämä and tuo seem to retain more of their basic 'pointing' quality than their English counterparts this and that. That they are capable of doing it may be due to the existence of a third,

neutral pronoun se, which is used in many of the functions in which English uses either this or that, particularly that. But in neither language is it possible to predict the other functions of the demonstratives from their purely deictic, 'pointing' use. In English that is less marked than this; according to Lyons (1977:647), 'there are marked syntactic positions in which that occurs in English and is neutral with respect to proximity or any other distinctions based on deixis'. The Finnish tuo is not neutral - perhaps again due to the existence of the demonstrative se - except as a determiner, in which position all three Finnish demonstratives come close to losing any distinctions based on deixis.

It was said in the introductory chapter that deictic expressions are pragmatic phenomena par excellence because they are concerned with 'the encoding of many different aspects of the circumstances surrounding the utterance, within the utterance itself' (Levinson 1983:55). The above discussion has, however, shown that the use of the demonstratives, although they are basically deictic expressions, cannot be wholly explained through referring to 'the ability of language users to pair sentence with the contexts in which they would be appropriate'. Their choice cannot be entirely explained with the help of the circumstances surrounding the utterance but their use seems to depend in some cases on how close psychologically the speaker feels the referent to be or how close to the referent he wants to make the listener feel. It must be therefore admitted that the explanations in these cases are beyond the reach of pragmatics.

'PLEASE' AND 'OLE HYVA'

Languages contain elements, words and phrases, that do not render themselves to normal semantic and grammatical analysis but can be adequately described only through reference to their contexts of use, i.e. items such as thank you, all right, OK, please. That this is the case is seen for example in the way dictionaries treat these items: often they do not even attempt to describe their meanings but give examples of the contexts in which they are used. Bilingual dictionaries, however, sometimes also give equivalents in the other language even when there is only a partial functional correspondence between the items, eg. they might give ole hyv  as the Finnish equivalent for please, although this information is partly misleading. Yet, it is obvious that these items play an important part in social interaction, particularly since some of them, eg. please, are considered 'to convey a speaker's intent to be heard as speaking politely' (Fraser 1978:11). Consequently, learning to use them correctly is not insignificant for the foreign language learners, particularly since they might be misled by the partial pragmatic equivalence between the foreign expression and one in their mother tongue. A systematic cross-language comparison of the use of such expressions as please and ole hyv  seems therefore justified.

According to the OED, please was originally an imperative or optative form, a shortened form of please you, whose meaning was originally 'may it (or let it) please you'. Its present meaning is described by the same source as 'be pleased' or 'if you please'. There does not seem to be any general agreement about its meaning, however, since for example Quirk et al (1972:471) paraphrase it with 'please me by ...'. Geukens (1978) is nearer to the OED definition when he argues that please has a conditional meaning, that it is in fact a lexicalization of an underlying conditional sentence (eg. 'if you don't mind'), and moreover, if added to a request, it makes the fulfilment of the request depend on the (good)will of the listener.

Syntactically, please has been considered to be in present-day English one of the formulaic adjuncts, 'a small group of adverbs used as markers of courtesy', like cordially, kindly, etc. (Quirk et al 1972:470). There is, however, a clear difference between please and the other formulaic adjuncts: it cannot be modified by very, whereas the others can. Thus, it is clearly not an adverb on a par with cordially and kindly, which even have the adverbial suffix -ly. Sadock (1974) assigns please two syntactic functions: that of a sentence-adverbial and

what he calls a free-standing please, which is a request by itself. It is not clear, however, what exactly distinguishes these two functions from each other. Sadock's example for the free-standing please is Please. It's cold in here, whereas please in Please, get me a drink would be a sentence-adverbial. But, which category would please in Please, Sir, did you call? belong? As these examples illustrate, the syntactic treatment of please is by no means straightforward.

The expression normally given as the Finnish equivalent for please is the phrase ole/olkaa hyvä, which is also an imperative form with the literal meaning of 'be good'. The phrase is, however, in the imperative form only when it stands alone or is attached to a sentence whose verb is in the imperative. If it is attached to an interrogative sentence functioning as a request, it appears in the interrogative form (oletko/oletteko hyvä), i.e. syntactically it follows the structure of the sentence with which it occurs. A further proof of this is that it has to be in the conditional form if the sentence is in the conditional. It cannot in other words be considered a formulaic adjunct like please but has retained the syntactic characteristics of a verb + adjective phrase. However, when used as a marker of politeness, the phrase has certainly lost some of its original, literal meaning. According to the NSS, the meaning of the adjective hyvä in this politeness phrase is a weakened use of its ethical meaning of 'morally valuable, flawless, innocent, noble'. It is difficult to see even this much of its original meaning in some of the contexts in which the phrase is used. There is another version of the phrase with a change in the adjective ole kiitii ('be nice'), which is more colloquial than ole hyvä. It cannot, however, be used in all the contexts in which ole hyvä occurs, due to the meaning of the adjective, as will be seen later. This supports the claim that the phrase is not a mere formulaic expression of politeness but the adjective in it has at least some meaning. Thus, it can be said that the Finnish phrase has retained more of its original syntactic and semantic properties than the corresponding English expression, and it will therefore be interesting to see to what extent this fact can account for the differences in their use.

Both the English please and its Finnish counterpart can be used independently or attached to a sentence. One of the most frequently occurring uses of both please and the Finnish phrase is in connection with directive speech acts. Thus both can be added to an imperative sentence to mitigate its illocutionary force, to make it more polite.

Please is mobile with imperative sentences: it can occur in the initial, final, and even medial position (Quirk et al 1972:270):

Please sit down!

Sit down please!

Ask him please what he wants!

The Finnish phrase must naturally be in the imperative form in this case and can be placed either before or after the main imperative sentence, but usually not in the medial position. If it is placed in the initial position, it is usually connected with the rest of the sentence with the conjunction ja ('and'):

Ole hyvä ja istu!

Istu, ole hyvä!

?Kysy häneltä, ole hyvä, mitä hän haluaa!

Naturally, neither please nor ole hyvä can occur with imperative sentences which do not have directive force: \*Take one more step, please, and I'll shoot/ Ota vielä yksikin askel, ole hyvä, ja minä ammun.

Please and ole hyvä can also be used with interrogative sentences with directive force. Again, please is mobile whereas the Finnish phrase has to precede the main interrogative sentence, whose grammatical form it also follows, being in the interrogative form and containing a conditional if the sentence itself has one:

Could you please open the window?

Oletko hyvä ja avaat ikkunan?

Ollaitko hyvä ja avaisit ikkunan?

Please also goes with any other type of sentence which is used with directive force. Thus it can be added also to declarative sentences used as directives:

You will please leave the room.

I wonder whether you would mind opening the window please.

According to Sadock (1974) and Gordon and Lakoff (1975), please can actually be added in front of any sentence that is used as a directive,

not only to those indirect directives which have become conventionalized, like the two examples above. Thus, the following sentences, which, if used as requests, have to be classified as hints, allow the addition of please:

Please, it's cold in here.

Please, it's ten o'clock.

This, according to Sadock, is the 'free-standing' please; 'a request in itself' and usually a request to stop doing something or to undo something that has just been done. It is up to the listener to figure out what is being requested in that particular context, because the speaker only gives a hint. This type of request only allows the initial please; the sentence-final please is limited only to those cases whose 'logical structure conveys a request' (Gordon and Lakoff 1975). Thus, 'It's cold in here please' is not possible. It could be said that in this case the function of please is to clarify the speech-act function of the utterance, making it clear that it is to be understood as a request.

The Finnish phrase cannot be used with hints meant to be taken as directives. There is a syntactic restriction to this: as was mentioned above, the Finnish phrase has to be adapted to the syntactic structure of the sentence to which it is attached and this is not possible in cases like Täällä on kylmä ('It's cold in here') or Kello on jo kymmenen ('It's ten o'clock'). The Finnish phrase always has a second person form of the verb olla and thus cannot be syntactically joined with sentences with a third person form. In connection with directives it is thus limited mainly to utterances that are imperative or interrogative in form. It might be possible also with declarative sentences with a second person subject like the following:

Sinä olet hyvä ja lähdet tästä huoneesta.

(You will please leave the room.)

but not with a declarative sentence without a second person subject:

\*Haluan sinun lähtevän tästä huoneesta, ole hyvä.

(I want you to leave this room please.)



The colloquial version of the Finnish phrase, ole kiltti, behaves syntactically like ole hyvä. Semantically, they are not equivalent, however, obviously due to the difference in meaning between the adjectives hyvä and kiltti: ole kiltti can be used with directives whose illocutionary force is that of an appeal but it cannot mitigate a command. Thus, for example, if the speaker offers the listener a seat, he/she does not say Ole kiltti ja istu!, but if the speaker is irritated by the fact that the listener is standing in spite of several offers of a seat, he/she might appeal to the listener by saying Ole kiltti ja istu. This is further proof of the meaningfulness of the adjectives in the Finnish phrase.

Both please and the Finnish phrase can occur even in reported directives. Thus it is possible to say in English He asked me if I would please leave the room, and in Finnish Hän pyysi minua olemaan hyvä ja lähtemään huoneesta. As the example shows, the Finnish phrase again follows the form of the verb in the main part of the sentence and is thus in an infinitive form (olemaan hyvä) required by the reporting verb.

In English, please can also be added to questions, i.e. interrogative sentences which function as requests for information. This fact has been used as an argument for the inclusion of questions into directive speech acts. It has been argued that, since they allow the addition of please, their underlying structure must contain a performative sentence like 'I request (you tell me S)'. Sadock (1974), however, admits that please can only be added to questions of a restricted type, namely those in which the speaker has no personal stake in the response'. His examples are from a context in which a teacher asks a pupil: Johnny, who discovered the Bronx, please?. It could not be added to questions like Where did you find that lovely dress, please?, claims Sadock. However, examples can be found that contradict Sadock's description of the contexts in which please can occur: a speaker asking What time is it, please? or on the phone, Who is speaking, please? or have a personal interest in the answer, which might even contain vital information. On the basis of these examples, it could be argued that please is added to questions when the speaker wants to appeal to the listener because the answer contains important information. Perhaps it should be said that please has here two different roles: in one case it is a mere politeness formula, in the other it makes the question more insistent. In any case, there is no possibility of adding the Finnish

olkaa hyvä, to questions, not even in cases in which it would be possible to join it syntactically with the sentence. Thus, Oletko hyvä ja lähdet Helsinkiin huomenna? is a request for action, not a request for information. The only way of getting ole hyvä attached to a question would be by adding a performative verb and making the question itself into a subordinate clause: Oletko hyvä ja kerrot minulle, mitä kello on? (literally: 'Will you be good and tell me what time it is?').

Another case in which the addition of please is normal in English but its Finnish counterpart is impossible is in utterances in which the speaker asks for permission to do something:

May I please go now?

Saanko lähteä nyt?

The Finnish phrase is impossible here because the sentence contains a first person subject and ole hyvä requires a second person subject.

In all the cases discussed so far, please and ole hyvä have been attached to a sentence functioning as a directive, a question or a request for permission to do something. Both can, however, also be used alone without an accompanying sentence, forming by themselves the second pair-part to an adjacency pair. Thus, both please and ole hyvä can be used as affirmative responses to a request for permission to do something:

Can I borrow your pen? - Please (do)!

Saanko lainata kynääsi? - Ole hyvä!

Can I be brutally frank? - Please (do)!

Saanko olla alvan suora? - Ole hyvä!

Please also occurs as an affirmative response to an offer, i.e. it shows the acceptance of the offer. It is often accompanied by the affirmative yes:

Shall I carry your bag for you? - (Yes) please.

Want any sugar? - (Yes) please.

In Finnish, ole/olkaa hyvä cannot occur in this function; the affirmative response to an offer in Finnish is normally Kyllä kiitos ('Yes thank you'):

Voinko kantaa laukkuasi? - Kyllä kiitos.

If the speaker answered the above question with Ole hyvä, it would mean that he/she had interpreted the utterance as a request for permission to do something. Thus, in the following example, which can only be interpreted as an offer, only kyllä kiitos is possible:

Haluatko sokeria? - Kyllä kiitos.

The Finnish ole/olkaa hyvä also occurs as a kind of second pair-part in an adjacency pair in which the first pair-part is a request to the listener to give something to the speaker; the pragmatic equivalent in English would in this case be Here you are:

Voitko antaa tuon lehden? - Ole hyvä.

Can you give me that paper? - Here you are.

Related to this is the use of ole/olkaa hyvä as a verbal accompaniment of the offer of some object, for example food at a dinner table, which is clearly a function in which please is not used. Another function in which ole/olkaa hyvä occurs but please does not is as a response to an expression of gratitude:

Kiitos avusta! - Ole hyvä!

Thank you for your help! - Don't mention it.

On the other hand, please has a further function not shared by the Finnish phrase: it occurs as a kind of attention-getter, as an appeal to someone to listen to the speaker, eg. Please, Sir, did you call?, or it can be added as a politeness formula to an attention-getter like Excuse me, please, but.... The pragmatic equivalent in Finnish is normally Anteeksi/suokaa anteeksi....

The cases discussed above should be sufficient proof of the claims made at the beginning of this paper that please and ole hyvä are only partially equivalent pragmatically and that this is at least partly due to

their different grammatical statuses and different meanings. It is clear that the Finnish expression is a verb + adjective phrase since the verb changes its form according to the form of the sentence to which it is attached. Unlike its English counterpart, it cannot be described as a mere formulaic adjunct. There is a syntactic restriction to the use of this phrase: it can only be adjoined to sentences with a second person subject, which limits its use, for example, in the connection of directives.

As to their meanings, neither phrase has retained its original meaning although, again, the Finnish expression is closer to it than the English one. In both cases it is difficult to describe the meaning in a way that would be applicable in all of the contexts in which the expression occurs. The paraphrase for please given by Quirk et al (1972), 'please me by' could be used when please is added to directives and so could Geukens's (1978) explanation of please as a lexicalization of a conditional sentence like 'If you don't mind'. Similarly, the Finnish phrase seems to be close to its literal interpretation in this function. The use of these expressions with directives is usually associated with intended politeness, or at least they are considered to mitigate the force of the utterance. Fraser (1978:11) claims that please could not be used in issuing a demand, 'an act which surely borders on being inherently impolite'. Yet, it seems possible to say in English Shut up, please with a demanding tone, just as well as it is possible to say in Finnish Olkaa hyvät ja pitäkää suunne kiinni, neither of which is particularly polite. It seems that in some cases please and ole/olkaa hyvä are attached to a directive to make it more insistent, rather than to mitigate its force. When these expressions are used as answers to someone asking for a permission to do something, the above interpretations seem to lose their value. It does not make sense to paraphrase Please do with 'Please me by doing it' when it is used as a response to someone asking for permission to be 'brutally frank'. Nor does it make sense to interpret ole hyvä as an appeal to the addressee's 'goodness' in the corresponding Finnish exchange. 'If it pleases you' would be a more suitable paraphrase in this case. Thus it is impossible to give a paraphrase for either please or ole hyvä that would be suitable in all contexts.

Yet, there are some cases in which the meanings of these expressions can be used as explanations for their not occurring in those contexts. Thus, if an offer of something has been made, there is no sense in accepting it with a phrase that appeals to the addressee's

goodness, i.e. by using ole hyvä in Finnish. Similarly, if we think that please means either 'please me by' or 'if it pleases you/if you don't mind', it is understandable that it is not used, like ole hyvä, as a response to somebody's expression of gratitude. But the Finnish phrase does not make any more sense in this case, which means that it, too, is a mere politeness formula without a meaning of its own in some contexts.

To sum up, we can say that the analysis of please and ole hyvä is more complex than would be the analysis of for example thank you and kiitos, of which we can say that they express the gratitude of the speaker or are used when the speaker feels grateful or thinks he/she is expected to show gratitude, i.e. the meaning of these phrases determines their use. As we have seen, this is not the case with either please or ole hyvä, whose correct use might therefore cause particular learning problems.

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